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HIS Article concerns one area where recently increased judicial
deference to business interests has forced new readings onto the
law without adequate explanation or, indeed, much explanation
for the change at all. It is about law that judges have arbitrarily revised,
not discovered. In little more than a decade, activist judges have tried to
sharply reduce an oilfield operator's duty to its investors, the "nonoper-
ators,"I by exaggerating the scope and impact of two clauses in the Joint
Operating Agreement (JOA), the dominant American oilfield investment
contract issued by the American Association of Petroleum Landmen
(AAPL). One of these clauses, Article VII.A., tries to disclaim partner-
ship status and obligations. The other, Article V.A., can become under
the new readings an all-encompassing liability-limiting exculpatory
clause.2
These new, expansive judicial readings detour from a long-traveled
road. Under doctrines ranging from joint-venture and mining-partner-
ship theories to trust-like duties and special rules for unit operators and
1. The "nonoperator" discussed in this Article is the nonoperating equity owner, the
"working interest owner," who generally invests under one of the standard joint operating
agreements. The term is used to distinguish this interest owner from royalty owners, net
profits owners, and, of course, the operator. Williams and Meyers define the "operator" as
"[al person, natural or artificial (e.g., corporate) engaged in the business of drilling wells
for oil and gas." HOWARD WILLIAMS & CHARLES MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS
TERMS 842 (8th ed. 1991).
2. AAPL, Form 610-1977 Model Form Operating Agreement, Articles V.A., VII.A.
[hereinafter 1977 JOAl (on file with the SMU Law Review). The AAPL adopted new
language that expressly narrowed the operator's duty in the 1989 JOA. AAPL, Form 610-
1989 Model Form Operating Agreement, Article VII.A. [hereinafter 1989 JOA]. At the
same time, it expressly preserved from this narrowing perhaps the two most critical areas
of operator conduct, its handling of investor money and production, and thus seems to
have acknowledged that a fiduciary duty can exist in these core areas. The Article discusses
this change in notes 80 and 94 infra and accompanying text.
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operators marketing nonoperator production, many courts previously
had treated operators as fiduciaries to their investors. Only in Texas were
courts likely to routinely preclude fiduciary responsibility, and even
there, joint ventures and mining partnerships usually received a factual
analysis under which the operator sometimes was deemed a fiduciary.
Academic commentary confirmed that the operator was likely to be a
fiduciary to its investors in the absence of unusual factors. Until the last
decade, most courts had refused to let Article VII.A.'s no-partnership
disclaimer block the possibility of a fiduciary obligation to the nonoperat-
ing investors as a matter of law, or let Article V.A.'s exculpatory clause
do so, either. This starting body of law is summarized in Part I.
In a reformation that began in the late 1980s and reached cruising
speed in the last decade, courts in many jurisdictions inflated these two
clauses to limit the operator's exposure in all its activities to acts of gross
negligence or willful misconduct. These cases have lowered the opera-
tor's responsibility and shifted a large group of risks to nonoperators. In
this way, they have created a zone of immunity for operators while rely-
ing on language that did not create such immunity but a few years before.
The courts have not justified this judicial about-face. Its result, how-
ever, is easy to see: substantially increased protection for the large corpo-
rations that dominate oilfield operations. Courts traditionally extend
fiduciary protection because of a party's dependence. Here, perversely,
they defer to the more powerful party, the operator, because of its con-
trol. Part II documents this change in the law.
Part III analyzes these changes. The new exemptions fit poorly with the
language on which they rely and, taken literally, install other contradic-
tions within the JOA. Moreover, courts rushing to protect operators have
ignored the standards that ordinarily limit efforts to avoid tort liability,
particularly joint efforts by competitors. Judges should no more uncriti-
cally accept efforts of large, established companies to reduce their liabil-
ity by standard-form disclaimers and exculpations than they would
sanction joint conduct among competitors to disavow tort responsibility
in other areas of the law. It is one thing to enforce the terms of a truly
bargained contract. It is another when dominant oil companies act to-
gether to avoid the duties ordinarily fixed by the common law.3
Part IV discusses the conflict that remains between some recent cases,
most notably those imposing trustee-type duties when the operator han-
dles nonoperator money and those making the operator an agent when it
markets its investors' production, and the no-duty cases. Noting that even
the most recently amended JOA leaves room for a fiduciary duty in these
areas, and discussing a recent trend to preserve claims for breach of the
3. The treatment of disclaimers and exculpatory clauses does not itself determine
whether, even without applying such contract barriers, courts should view the oilfield oper-
ator as a fiduciary. The author will address that issue systematically in a future article. The
issue discussed here is only whether there is a justification for courts refusing to even con-
sider that underlying issue because of these two threshold contract terms.
2003]
SMU LAW REVIEW
JOA itself from the disclaimers, it predicts that all courts (except, per-
haps, the extremely business-deferential Texas Supreme Court and its
counterparts on the Fifth Circuit) will end up carving out at least these
major areas from the recent assault on the operator duty. The battle over
these standards might even provide the impetus for a more careful articu-
lation of the operator duty itself.
I. THE OLD REGIME: THE OPERATOR CAN BE A
FIDUCIARY DESPITE DISCLAIMERS
AND EXCULPATORY CLAUSES
The technical topic of the "operator/nonoperator" relationship is a vital
issue in a still-vital American industry. Most drilling in the domestic
United States is done via joint ventures in which an active oil company,
the operator, makes the key business decisions, while investors, the no-
noperators, provide most of the funds, retain certain key votes, and have
a general right to monitor the project. This division of responsibilities has
allowed oil and gas companies to amass very large pools of property with
relatively low initial outlays, while enabling investors without similar
know-how to share the risks and rewards of technologically complex drill-
ing operations. 4
Until the late 1980s and early 1990s, most courts regulated investment
in this key industry by employing a variety of legal concepts that could
make operators fiduciaries to their investors. Courts often enforced these
high obligations in spite of the JOA's no-partnership disclaimer and lia-
bility-limiting exculpatory clause.5 Mainstream academic commentators
generally treated the operator as a fiduciary to its nonoperators.
A. MANY MAINSTREAM JOINT-VENTURE CASES GRAPPLED WITH THE
FIDUCIARY QUESTION WITHOUT LETTING NO-PARTNERSHIP
OR EXCULPATORY CLAUSES DERAIL THEM
Any understanding of the changed judicial interpretation has to begin
with the terms of the JOA, under which American oilfield parties tradi-
tionally have conducted oil and gas exploration and development. 6 Until
4. Joint operations also enable even the wealthiest oil companies to diffuse their risk
in some of the most expensive oilfield projects, for instance deep offshore projects, and
thus add predictability to their performance.
5. One recent article, which discusses little of the older tradition, claims that "it ap-
pears that ten years ago, relatively few cases dealt specifically with the AAPL Form 610
Model Form Operating Agreement." John R. Reeves & J. Matthew Thompson, The Devel-
opment of the Model Form Operating Agreement: An Interpretative Accounting, 54 OKLA.
L. REv. 211, 213 (2001). If that were the case, the early operator cases might be irrelevant
to recent decisions, which would be the first to interpret the JOA. This Article shows that
Reeves and Thompson's premise is incorrect; many early cases either expressly dealt with
the JOA or, while not naming the specific form interpreted, dealt with language identical
to JOA language.
6. The JOA traditionally has been the controlling document in American oil and gas
investments. See, e.g., William A. Keefe, The Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreement Un-
raveling Some Knots, 36 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 18-1, 18-2 (1990) ("The model form is
used in nearly every domestic, multiple party venture for the onshore drilling of oil and
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1989, the JOA had two primary clauses on the operator's overall duty.
Paragraph VII.A. announced that the parties' liability was several, not
joint, and that they did not intend to enter a mining or other association
"or to render the parties liable as partners."' 7 Article V.A. gave the opera-
tor full control of all operations on the "Contract Area," with a duty to
act "in a good and workmanlike manner," but with the operator's liability
at least for covered operations limited to "gross negligence or willful mis-
conduct."'8 The JOA did not discuss in detail exactly which conduct was
so favorably sheltered (all activity? physical operations only? dealings
with third parties only?). The transition from the fiduciary world that ex-
tended well into the 1980s to today's judicial reaching out to shield opera-
tors generally occurred under the standard pre-1989 version of these two
Articles, and not under the current 1989 model form.9
An influential Oklahoma Supreme Court case from the late 1960s typi-
fies the traditional analysis of the internal operator/nonoperator relation-
ship. In Oklahoma Co. v. O'Neill,10 the operator, the Oklahoma
gas. No other instrument employed in the exploration and production business receives
acceptance even approaching that accorded the A.A.P.L. paradigm."); J.O. Young, Oil and
Gas Operating Agreements: Producers 88 Operating Agreements, Selected Problems and
Suggested Solutions, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 197, 199 (1975) (AAPL Form 610 "has
gained such general acceptance, even by major companies, that it may be considered a
Standard Operating Agreement"). See generally ANDREW DERMAN, THE NEW AND IM-
PROVED 1989 JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT: A WORKING MANUAL 1 (1991) (AAPL
procedures have "been effective in establishing procedures and obligations which have re-
sulted in the drilling of tens of thousands of wells").
7. 1977 JOA, supra note 2, Article VII.A.
8. Id. Article V.A.
9. The JOA contains a third major reduction in nonoperators' rights in Exhibit C, an
accounting appendix, that essentially gives nonoperators only two years from the end of
the calendar year in which a joint-account bill is received to challenge the charges in it.
COUNCIL OF PETROLEUM ACCOUNTANTS SOCIETIES, ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE JOINT OP-
ERATIONS Article 1.4. (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Copas]; COUNCIL OF PETROLEUM Ac-
COUNTANTS SOCIETIES, ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE JOINT OPERATIONS Article 1.4.A.
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 Copas]. Courts generally enforce this clause. Some courts have
harshly enforced this provision. See Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d
1408, 1414-16 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that neither counterclaim in litigation nor two years
of negotiations over audit issues were specific enough to form "claim for adjustment");
Antweil v. Keesing, 115 B.R. 299, 301, 305 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1990) (applying this Copas
provision to bar claim of nonoperator who had been in divorce proceedings at time he
noticed overcharges, and who had never been credited with equipment he furnished to
joint account; in the court's words, "[t]he Court finds the result in this case distasteful due
to the fact that the defendant is now liable for a debt for which he was over billed and for
which he was not given credit for materials he provided"). Courts generally agree, how-
ever, that the Copas claims bar is not intended to shield the operator from claims of fraud.
Calpetco 1981, 989 F.2d at 1413-14; Caddo Oil Co. v. O'Brien, 908 F.2d 13, 17 (5th Cir.
1990); Exxon v. Crosby-Mississippi Resources, Ltd., 775 F. Supp. 969, 976 (S.D. Miss.
1991), affd in part, rev'd in part, 40 F.3d 1474 (5th Cir. 1995). Presumably, they would not
use it to bar a claim for breach of fiduciary duty either.
This Article does not address the Copas claims limit because it does not bar tort claims
as such and because there has not been a substantial broadening of the protections given
the operator under this clause.
10. Oklahoma Co. v. O'Neill, 333 P.2d 534 (Okla. 1958) [hereinafter Oklahoma Co. 1],
vacated upon discovery that Judge had succumbed to bribery, 431 P.2d 445 (Okla. 1967)




Company, overstated lease costs and expenses; urged investors to rely on
the report of an engineer whom it secretly had on commission; took roy-
alties out of the joint property without notice; and misstated produc-
tion. ' The parties had a written operating agreement that, like the JOA,
denied an intent to "create a partnership, a co-partnership or mining
partnership."' 2 In spite of this language, the court decided to treat the
operator as a fiduciary if the plaintiffs proved three standard joint-ven-
ture elements: (1) a joint interest; (2) an express or implied agreement to
share profits and losses; and (3) "acts or conduct reflecting cooperation in
the project."' 13
Not only did the court give these factors priority over the no-partner-
ship language, but it did so aggressively. The plaintiffs had almost no evi-
dence of joint cooperation, the third fiduciary prong. Yet the Oklahoma
Supreme Court let the slightest evidence satisfy that requirement. It held
that one visit to the well and minor lease examination were enough. 14
These minimal acts were cooperation "under these circumstances" even
though "management and operation" stayed with the Oklahoma Com-
pany. 15 The court thus treated this ordinary operating relationship as a
fiduciary one in spite of no-partnership language. 16 A number of other
11. Oklahoma Co. II1, 440 P.2d at 985.
12. The agreement stated that any rights that might arise from "any partner, co-part-
ner, or mining partner relationship," or from entering an agreement for the operation of
the property, "or from any other fact," were superseded by the rights set out in the con-
tract. The Oklahoma Supreme Court recited these terms in its prior decision in Oklahoma
Co. I, 333 P.2d at 542. The parties signed an operating agreement at the same time as they
signed the leases, an event that was completed on June 6, 1956. Oklahoma Co. 111, 440 P.2d
at 982. The AAPL issued its first JOA in 1956, but an industry form contract had been
under discussion since 1952. Young, supra note 6, at 199-200. While it is not clear whether
the Oklahoma Co. agreement incorporated the terms of that first JOA, presumably those
terms would have been publicly available even had the AAPL not used exactly the same
terms in the first model operating agreement.
13. See Oklahoma Co. III, 440 P.2d at 984-85. In spite of the no-partnership dis-
claimer, the court was applying what it called "[tihe well recognized requirements for de-
termining whether a business relationship between two or more persons constitutes a joint
adventure." Id. at 984.
14. Id. at 985.
15. Id.
16. The operator tried to argue that the disclaimers had to prevail unless fraud could
be proven, id. at 983 ("if fraud was not established then the operating agreement was con-
trolling and there was no mining partnership, joint adventure"), and that the court had to
reach the fraud issue first. The court rejected this approach. It found instead that the criti-
cal issue was the fiduciary relationship and that "a determination of these questions should
be in the reverse order." Id. at 984. Thus, the court put the fiduciary issue before the
question of fraud. In view of this priority, efforts to suggest that Oklahoma Co. III can be
distinguished because of the claim of fraud are not persuasive. Compare Philip Watts, Con-
tingent Liability of the Passive Working Interest Investor Under Operating Agreements in
Oklahoma, 54 OKLA. B.J. 2797, 2801 (1983) ("Had there not been an element of fraud
which seemed to pervade the case, the Court arguably would not have been so willing to
find the element of cooperation satisfied.").
The Oklahoma Supreme Court made this decision with unusual self-consciousness be-
cause, in an earlier decision in the same case in which one of the judges had accepted a
bribe, the court found the operator was not a fiduciary, relying heavily on the disclaimer,
but then reversed itself. Compare Oklahoma Co. 1, 333 P.2d at 542-43 (rejecting fiduciary
duty), with Oklahoma Co. III, 440 P.2d 978 (Okla. 1968) (finding duty).
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jurisdictions have treated operators as fiduciaries under joint-venture
theories. 17
Texas has been more restrictive than any other jurisdiction in interpret-
ing the operator's duty, but the great majority of the Texas operator cases
concerned third parties trying to hold nonoperators liable for expenses of
operation, not disputes over the operator's internal duty to its investors.
In Rankin v. Naftalis,'8 an early Texas Supreme Court opinion that did
concern the link between the operator and its partners, the court seem-
ingly applied a broad fiduciary approach. The parties shared one lease,
and the defendant had promised to acquire an adjoining property for
their joint interest, but instead leased that property for himself.' 9 The
trial court submitted a jury issue asking whether the parties "were jointly
engaged in the business of operating the Melton lease," a question the
jury answered affirmatively.20 This finding established a joint venture
and, hence, a fiduciary relationship. 2'
Though the supreme court reversed because it decided that the chal-
lenged conduct was outside the scope of the fiduciary duty-the second
17. For another early Oklahoma case that took a strong view of the operator's duty
and tied it to an operating agreement, albeit without elaborating its terms, see Britton v.
Green, 325 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1963). Britton allegedly failed to drill enough wells, allowed
drainage, billed excessive costs, and appropriated storage tanks. See id. at 385. The court
ruled that entering an "operating contract had the effect of constituting Britton the operat-
ing agent or trustee for all the co-tenants, in all matters respecting the operation of both
leases." Id. at 383. The court did not detail the terms of the agreement, but it did say that
the investors had "uniform operating agreements" and that the terms designated Britton
operator, with the right to purchase the oil, and the duty to manage and operate the leases
for the mutual interest of all leaseholders. Id. at 381, 384. With so little detail, the opinion
never mentioned whether there were disclaimers. Britton agreed to act for his co-tenants,
making him their trustee. "As operating agent, the co-tenant assumed to act for and on
behalf of his co-tenants, and he is thus the trustee for his co-tenants and co-adventurers."
Id. at 383. Whatever the terms of the Britton operating contract, what the court was
describing was the effect of a standard JOA; and consistent application of this principle
would make most operators fiduciaries.
In Blackstock Oil Co. v. Caston, 87 P,2d 1087 (Okla. 1939), the operator concealed good
results in order to buy out its investors. Id. at 1088. The Oklahoma Supreme Court com-
pared the operator relationship to other relationships that "enable[ ] the person in which
confidence or trust is reposed to exert influence over the person trusting him." Id. at 1089.
It noted that the parties had an agreement to share ownership and costs, id. at 1088, but
beyond that the opinion gives virtually no details of the agreement's terms.
In Schunide Oil Co. v. Onar Operating Co., 458 N.W.2d 659 (Mich. App. 1990), a Michi-
gan appellate court found a fiduciary duty owed by the defendants, who had reduced the
lessee's interests by secretly acquiring unleased interests after learning of a defect in the
lessee's title. The court of appeals, holding that "[p]rojects for the development of oil and
gas wells are joint ventures" and therefore fiduciary, agreed that this breached their fiduci-
ary duty. Id. at 662, 664-67. Two other states have found a breach of fiduciary duty on quite
similar facts. See TXO v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 668 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Ark. 1984); Carroll
v. Caldwell, 147 N.E.2d 69, 73-74 (I11. 1957). For a number of other fiduciary cases on lease
acquisition issues, see infra note 30.
18. 557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977).
19. Naftalis v. Rankin, 542 S.W.2d 893, 895-96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976), rev'd,
557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977). Defendant Rankin lied about the adjoining landowner's inter-
est in leasing and even about whether he had secured the lease. Id. at 896-97.
20. Id. at 895. Rankin "admitted that the parties were jointly engaged in the produc-




lease lay outside the JOA contract area22-it did not question the fiduci-
ary nature of the joint development. It "recognize[d] that the relationship
between the parties in the Melton lease was fiduciary in character," that
their "fiduciary duties arose from the relationship of joint ownership of
the mineral rights of a particular mineral lease," and that the affected
conduct included "paying the production costs" and "sharing the bene-
fits" of the lease. 23 These are standard aspects of JOA relations. The
Texas Supreme Court even seemed to group the operator with other
traditional fiduciaries: executors, administrators, guardians, attorneys,
and partners.24
The Rankin parties had their own contract, although neither the court
of appeals nor the supreme court described many of its terms. 25 The
agreement was a customized operating agreement, not the standard
JOA.26 However, the supreme court filled its opinion with fiduciary lan-
guage and approved the language used by the court of appeals in the face
of a liability-limiting Texas statute that sounds much like the no-partner-
ship disclaimer. The Texas statute provided that operating a property
"under a joint operating agreement does not of itself establish a partner-
ship."'27 The court agreed that simply proving a joint operating relation-
ship would not prove a formal partnership (a relationship that is not
limited to a specific venture),28 but it held that the statute did not extin-
22. Rankin, 557 S.W.2d at 945.
23. Id. at 944. The Texas Supreme Court used traditional joint-venture language and
cited other joint-venture cases of limited geographic scope. Id. at 944-45. It did discuss
Texas cases that concern the "informal" fiduciary relationship built upon a prior confiden-
tial relationship, id. at 944, but it followed that observation with a discussion of traditional
oilfield joint-venture cases, id. at 944-45. Moreover, the jury's underlying findings did not
concern a prior confidential relationship, id. at 943, and the case therefore cannot rest on
an informal duty.
24. The court mentioned these classic fiduciary capacities in noting that confidential
relationships are "broader when the defendant is a fiduciary," in a sentence followed by its
pronouncement discussed in text that it "recognize[d] that the relationship between the
parties in the Melton lease was fiduciary in character." Id. at 944.
25. Early in the opinion, the court noted that each plaintiff invested through a contract
that gave the operator control "of the drilling, development, operations, marketing, ac-
counting, and the execution of division orders." Id. at 942. The agreements with this Article
V.A.-like language identified the first lease, the Melton lease, as they described the geo-
graphic scope of the venture. When the court later held that the adjoining property fell
outside the fiduciary venture, it described them as "outside of the operating agreement."
Id. at 946.
26. Naftalis and the other interest owners tried to avoid the Texas statute discussed
next on the ground that "there was no joint operating agreement between the parties."
Respondents Reply to Robert E. Rankin's Application for Writ of Error at 26, Rankin v.
Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977) (No. B-6647). At the same time, to sooth predictable
judicial concerns that every co-owned lease would become a joint venture, they argued that
the fiduciary aspect of their relationship was that "the co-owners work the mine or operate
the lease-that is participate in the decisions concerning operation of the mine or lease."
Id. at 25.
27. Rankin, 557 S.W.2d at 945 (citing TEx. REV. CiV. S'iA'i. ANN. Art. 6123b § 7).
28. In citing the Texas statute, the court used it to reject the plaintiffs' argument that
the operating relationship created "a broader partnership arrangement." Rankin, 557
S.W.2d at 945. It rejected the idea that a joint operating arrangement was enough to im-
pose liability "to operations by one of the parties on other and different lands," an area
that would be "outside the scope of the fiduciary duties that were established." Id. at 946.
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guish Rankin's duty to its investors within the area the parties intended to
develop. Moreover, the agreement gave the operator sole control in
strong terms, as does the JOA,2 9 yet that did not block the duty. None of
this language precluded the operator from being a fiduciary.
Oklahoma Co. and Rankin, opinions by the highest courts in two major
oilfield jurisdictions, fall squarely within mainstream oil and gas law.
Neither court hesitated to pronounce the operator's fiduciary duty to its
investors. Rankin followed many opinions in Texas and elsewhere that
treated the operating relationship as fiduciary, but limited the duty to
share property acquisitions to leases within the venture's geographic
boundaries. 3o
The court hinted that the statute's purpose was to limit liability to third parties by citing a
commentator's claim that operating-agreement parties "[ojrdinarily ... do not intend and
should not be compelled to bear each other's liabilities." Id. at 946 n.6 (citation omitted).
29. See supra note 25.
30. For an influential case in which the Kansas Supreme Court treats the operator as a
fiduciary but limits the geographic scope of its duty, see Foley & Loomis v. Phillips, 508
P.2d 975, 979 (Kan. 1973). "The relationship of coadventurers in oil and gas ventures is
one of trust and confidence in all matters respecting the conduct and operation of the
business for which the joint venture was formed. ... Foley, at 979. The Kansas court
defined the geographic boundaries as limited to the section where the parties first acquired
leases. Id. at 977, 980. In a later case, First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sidwell Corp., 678
P.2d 118 (Kan. 1984), the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed a judgment making a petroleum
geologist share a nearby acreage acquisition on a joint-venture theory, in spite of an oper-
ating agreement that disclaimed "any relationship of mining or other partnership as be-
tween us," id. at 121, because the agreement "when considered in its entirety" sustained a
joint venture, id. at 124. Until the Great Retrenchment of recent years, joint-venture doc-
trines, like mining partnerships, were supple tools to increase standards of care in joint
oilfield projects. The Kansas Supreme Court recently followed both cases in another prop-
erty-exclusion case. See Amoco v. Charles B. Wilson, Jr., Inc., 976 P.2d 941 (Kan. 1999);
discussion infra note 126 and accompanying text.
Many of the opinions simply do not describe their governing operating agreement, much
less any disclaimers in them. In one opinion, again using fiduciary duty language but draw-
ing a geographic circle around the duty, the parties had a written contract but, as is all too
common, the court did not describe its terms fully. See Warner v. Winn, 197 S.W.2d 338
(Tex. 1946). It did, however, cite some provisions and then note that the operating contract
had "twenty-two separate paragraphs," which not only defined rights in detail but "con-
tain[ ] the agreements usually appearing in operating contracts for the protection of both
parties." Id. at 340.
In Johnson v. Peckham, 120 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1938), the parties had two leases "owning
equal shares in the leases and sharing equally the profits and losses of the enterprise." Id.
at 786. The opinion gave no added details of their arrangement as it affirmed the court of
appeal's conclusion that one partner could not buy out the other without disclosing a pend-
ing sale to a third party. Id. at 787-88. In Whatley v. Cato Oil Co., 115 S.W.2d 1205 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938, no writ), an opinion forcing the defendant to share a property
with its coadventurer, the court cited only small pieces of the contract. Id. at 1206, 1208.
(The earlier the case, the less the dominance of standard forms and the less certain what, if
any, disclaimer clauses might have existed.) In Shell v. Prestidge, 249 F.2d 413 (5th Cir.
1957), the Fifth Circuit affirmed a joint venture between Shell and a driller to whom it had
assigned its interest, retaining a royalty and certain other rights, see id. at 415; there is no
indication whether the agreement had disclaimers in it. In Wilcox Oil Co. v. Empire Oil of
Texas, 195 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1952), the trial court found a joint adventure partnership, but
the court of appeals found it unnecessary to resolve the effect of this partnership because it
found no agreement on the added drilling whose costs were in dispute. The opinion does
not give a clue to the overall agreement or any disclaimer clauses.
In a more recent Texas case, Fuqua v. Taylor, 683 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), the plaintiff's rights arose from a letter option agreement, id. at 737, and
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A number of older cases rejected fiduciary status for a given operating
relationship, particularly in Texas. Most of these cases, however, involved
supply companies and other vendors trying to sue the nonoperators, not
just the joint account, and using a fiduciary claim to make nonoperators
pay more than their committed share of the project. It is not surprising
that these outside efforts to exploit a fiduciary duty foundered because
they ignored the settled industry understanding that the joint account, not
individual owners and their personal assets, supplies the credit for the
joint operation.
A Texas Supreme Court opinion, Ayco Development Corp. v. G.E.T.
Service Co.,3' is one of the lead third-party cases. Four oilfield service
companies sued to recover for "supplies and services. '32 Though Ayco
did not involve a standard JOA, the governing agreement included lan-
guage like the JOA's, as well as some added limiting language. The agree-
ment limited "the Partnership's" contribution to a fixed amount just
under half a million dollars. The company designated operator would drill
the well "in its individual capacity," and the agreement gave the operator
"control and supervision of the actual operations of every kind," lan-
guage much like Article V.A.33 A separate Drilling Contract stated that
the "Joint Venture shall have no control over the well," a stronger prohibi-
tion on nonoperator participation than in the JOA. 34 The contract also
made the operator responsible for all costs, provided that it would indem-
nify nonoperators for any claims or causes of action, and included a dis-
claimer like Article VII.A. that the agreement did not "set up a
the court applied a Rankin-like geographic limit to the duty, finding a violation for letting
the plaintiff share in one lease but not another.
Another oft-cited, early joint-venture case, British Am. Oil Producing Co. v. Midway Oil
Co., 82 P.2d 1050 (Okla. 1938), added to the irritating history of courts that do not fully
explain the subject agreement. The parties had a joint development agreement that was
"reduced to writing at great length," id. at 1050, and that "in considerable detail, sets out
the mutual rights, liabilities and duties of the parties, one to the other," id. at 1052. But the
court sketched only the most general details. So it is impossible to know what disclaimers
and liability limiting language existed in it. British American is an early, strong statement of
the essentially fiduciary nature of standard joint development arrangements, even as it also
stands for the Rankin proposition that parties do not have to share acreage acquired
outside the joint venture's boundaries.
Courts may cut off the duty to share property acquired in the area of the shared venture
if the venture has terminated, see, e.g., Madrid v. Norton, 596 P.2d 1108 (Wyo. 1979),
although by rights they first should engage in a searching examination to make sure that
the acquisition was not consummated during the joint-venture period or using joint-ven-
ture information. Presumably courts would restrict the duty to the Area of Mutual Interest,
if the parties had agreed to a limited area for property-sharing in this common industry
clause.
31. 616 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. 1981).
32. Id. at 185.
33. Brief of Appellants at 1 ex. 1, § 5, 9, Energy Fund of Am., Inc. v. G.E.T. Serv.
Co., 610 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980) (No. 8362) [hereinafter Brief of
Appellants]. The Joint Venture Agreement referred to an attached Operating Agreement
as Exhibit D, but it is not referenced in the briefs and apparently is not part of the record.
Brief of Appellees Halliburton Co. and Schlumberger Well Servs. at 8, Energy Fund of
Am., Inc. v. G.E.T. Serv. Co., 610 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980) (No.
8362) [hereinafter Brief of Appellees].
34. Brief of Appellants, supra note 33, at 1 ex. 3, § 6(a).
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partnership or joint venture. '35
The service companies apparently did not plead a mining partnership. 36
The parties' use of "Joint Venture Agreement" in their contract's caption
and partnership language in its text presumably made joint-venture the-
ory irresistible to the plaintiffs. 3 7 Arguing against such a fiduciary duty,
the nonoperators discounted the joint-venture label by citing authority
that formal partnership designations are not conclusive, as well as a raft
of Texas courts that have turned down efforts by service companies to
collect on their bills from nonoperators. 38
The trial court accepted the service company's joint liability theory.
But the court of appeals reversed, and the supreme court affirmed and
ordered a take nothing judgment. "[A]s a matter of law," the investors
were not joint venturers. 39 Ignoring any difference between the standard
JOA and the Ayco Joint Venture agreement, 40 the supreme court relied
interchangeably on joint-venture and mining-partnership cases holding
nonoperators not liable to service companies. It did not, however, pro-
vide any reasoning to explain why a fiduciary duty should not apply
internally. 4 1
As a practical matter, today's conservative, business-oriented Texas Su-
preme Court is likely to protect most operators by refusing to categorize
the operator as a fiduciary in operator/nonoperator cases as well as third-
party cases. Ayco is but one of many Texas cases finding that an operating
35. Id.
36. Id. at 24. The service companies pointed out that the nonoperators were to be
involved in choosing the well site and deciding upon further development and completion;
that one of them was at the well site when the well was drilled and hired his own consultant
to advise him on the progress; and that one vendor's representatives spoke with him when
having trouble getting paid and then received his money just two days later. Brief of Ap-
pellees, supra note 33, at 19-20.
37. Looking just at the labels the parties used, Ayco might have seemed a strong fidu-
ciary case. The parties had a customized agreement captioned "Joint Venture Agreement"
(as well as a separate "Drilling Contract)," and used the labels "joint venture" and "part-
nership" liberally in their contract. Brief of Appellants, supra note 33, at I exs. 1, 3. A close
look at the supposed joint venture's terms, however, suggested otherwise, as the text
shows.
38. Id. at 25-27.
39. Ayco, 616 S.W.2d at 186.
40. The service companies had "never disputed" the "legal point" that "a joint operat-
ing agreement does not of itself create a partnership." Brief of Appellees, supra note 33, at
23. But they argued that their joint-venture agreement was quite distinct, and tried to dis-
tance themselves from the nonoperators' cases because of the lack of any operating agree-
ment. Id. at 24-28.
41. The court did mention that the nonoperators could not be joint venturers when
their contracts left them "wholly excluded from participation in the drilling, operation, and
control of the well." Ayco, 616 S.W.2d at 186. This conclusion most likely referred to the no
control language of the Drilling Contract, but it could, of course, have encompassed the
Joint Venture agreement's delegation of actual control to the Operator. The court addi-
tionally mentioned the agreement fixing the nonoperators' possible contributions as other
evidence incompatible with a partnership. Id. After reciting that nonoperators were ex-
cluded from management, the court added: "Their contract with Energy Fund was that
they would pay $154,000 for a part of the costs of drilling each well. They did that." Id. But
it did not explain the precise mechanics through which it got from the Joint Venture Agree-
ment to the holding as a matter of law that the parties did not have a joint venture.
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relationship, often under a standard JOA, is not a fiduciary one. Like
Ayco, though, the great majority of these cases involves third-party
claims, not internal disputes. 42 Other Texas cases have extended the
42. As an example, the Ayco court cited in text eight prior Texas joint-venture or min-
ing-partnership cases, four from the Texas Supreme Court, as support for its conclusion
that no joint venture existed. Of these, five involved third parties who supplied goods or
services to the joint account via a contract with the operator but were trying to reach
beyond the joint account and impose full liability directly on the nonoperators. In Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, the claim was to foreclose a materialman's lien to collect
for supplies and equipment provided to the well. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn,
355 S.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962), affd in relevant part, modified on
other grounds, 363 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1962). Rucks v. Burch, 156 S.W.2d 975 (Tex. 1941),
centered on a rented drilling rig. In U.S. Truck Lines v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 497, 498
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, writ ref'd), the suit was to hold nonoperator Texaco liable
for the unpaid cost of building a board road. In Gardner v. Wesner, 55 S.W.2d 1104, 1105
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1933, writ ref'd), the service company sued to foreclose a
mechanic's lien after having been hired to remove a bailer and clean an oil well. In Root v.
Tomberlin, 36 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1931, writ ref'd), a drilling company's
partners sued after drilling a well for defendants.
A hybrid third-party case, where a court found that a partnership existed, presented
unusual facts because the issue was not whether the supply company could hold nonoper-
ators liable, but whether its lien took precedence over that of a nonoperator who had
agreed to complete the well in return for securing his interest. See Wagner Supply Co. v.
Bateman, 18 S.W.2d 1052, 1053 (Tex. 1929). Thus it was pretty obvious that this nonoper-
ator had participated actively in the venture; he "did the labor and the work of operating
the mining enterprise and making the well produce oil." Id. at 1055.
Two cases were internal disputes. Munsey v. Mills & Garitty, 115 Tex. 469, 283 S.W. 754
(1926), had to decide whether an equity owner who acquired his interest from the original
landowner's daughter could disinherit the long-time operator, who at great risk and cost
had developed a large field. The equity owner claimed that the original parties did not have
a partnership and the operator's interest, therefore, was personal to him and did not sur-
vive his death. The court found that the relationship "clearly Iwas] a mining partnership."
Id. at 758. The other case, Luling Oil & Gas Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref Co., 191 S.W.2d 716(Tex. 1946), was a lawsuit between two owners of a lease over the right to an accounting.
Although the opinion contains strong language about the burden of showing a partnership,
this was dicta: "Whether the relationship of joint adventure or mining partnership existed
... does not seem to us to be the controlling issue, since the rights of the parties are fixed
by the terms of their agreement." Id. at 720. The court then held that the contract set out
the proper time for adjusting accounts and that its timetable barred the plaintiff's claim.
The Texas Supreme Court cited eight more cases in footnote, Ayco, 616 S.W.2d at 186
n.1, but only one actually involved a true internal operator/nonoperator dispute. Two of
the cases, Berchelnann v. Western Co., 363 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1963, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), and Misco-United Supply, Inc. v. Petroleum Corp., 462 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1972),
involved the paradigmatic third-party lawsuit to recover supplies provided to the joint ac-
count. Two others involved vendors who had contracted with drilling companies, not the
operators, but nonetheless were trying to fix liability on the lessee. See J. Robert Neal v.
McElveen, 320 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, no writ); Shell v. Caudle, 63
F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1933). Price v. Wrather, 443 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.c.), was an internal dispute between operator and nonoperator, but not a
serious claim: the plaintiff's proof of agreement was only his hazy recollection that "we
made arrangements and agreements, I'm sure, but I don't remember what they are," and
the court found "no mutual right of control," nor an agreement to share profits or losses.
Id. at 351-52. And Kahn v. Smelting Company, 102 U.S. 641 (1880), was an odd case to cite,
because it reversed a case in which the court had found no mining partnership for a new
hearing, with "the parties to be at liberty to produce new proofs." Id. at 647.
Shell v. Caudle actually vouched for a liberal interpretation of the mining-partnership
doctrine. It held that the driller who was to acquire a half-interest upon completing a test
well, with Shell having "management of the whole lease," nonetheless contemplated a min-
ing partnership, Shell v. Caudle, 63 F.2d at 298-all this even though the court's description
did not sound as if the driller, McClanahan, would have any control over operations from
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third-party reasoning to the internal relationship without considering the
difference between the two situations. Yet the difference is critical: third-
party vendors do not care about the operator's internal duties and, in
those disputes, the nonoperators have no incentive to argue for a fiduci-
ary relationship. For example, with one aberration, in none of the vendor
cases cited by the Texas Supreme Court in Ayco did the operator or no-
noperator try to raise, or have an incentive to make,43 the argument that
the parties had a fiduciary relationship.44 The nonoperators, often at the
end of an unsuccessful project, want to avoid direct liability to the ven-
dor, so they have every incentive to deny a partnership, even if they really
believe that their operator has a partner's fiduciary responsibility toward
them. The vendors, on the other hand, claim a fiduciary relationship, but
they do not have an incentive to prove that an internal duty survives the
disclaimers between operator and nonoperator. Their only worry is to
prove that their rights are not limited by the JOA, an agreement to which
they are not a party.45
that point on. This was not the only cited case with a broad reading of mining partnerships.
State v. Harrington, 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1966), was a suit to enforce penalties for drilling a
well that violated Railroad Commission rules. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed a judg-
ment against all interest owners, and included a finding that they were in a mining partner-
ship even though the parties had no written agreement and the court's description did not
identify any acts of control by two of the four remaining defendants, Allgood and Lutes.
Id. at 477-78. Indeed, their main "act" seems to have been receiving progress reports. Id.
This leaves only one case, Barrett v. Ferrell, 550 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), that involved an internal operator/nonoperator dispute and that denied a
mining partnership. But it did so relying on two cases involving other disputes: State v.
Harrington, the penalty case, and Gardner v. Wesner, the third-party supply case, both
discussed above. See Barrett, 550 S.W.2d at 143-44.
43. One might argue that in the vendor context, the operator has a perverse incentive
to claim a mining partnership or joint venture in order to spread some of its liability to the
nonoperators. But given that they could sue the operator under the JOA, arguing that the
operator had agreed to only bill for a nonoperator's proportionate share, a finding of a
mining partnership or joint venture should not help the operator, even if it gave an unex-
pected recovery to the vendor. Further, an operator that publicly disavowed the limits on
joint-account funding in the JOA should not be surprised to find its pool of future investors
drying up, or limited to very unknowledgeable investors.
44. The aberration is Wagner Supply Co. v. Bateman, 18 S.W.2d 1052 (Tex. 1929), the
case over lien priority. Bateman acquired an interest in the lease by agreeing to finish the
well, and both it and the Wagner Supply Company ended up with unpaid bills. Bateman
did claim a partnership: "According to Bateman's own allegations, Roberts and his associ-
ates were a partnership . I..." d  at 1055. But Bateman, although an interest owner, was
acting just as if it was a vendor. It had an unpaid bill and the partnership finding would let
it enforce its claims against all participants, not just the operator.
45. In Youngstown, for instance, vendor Youngstown was quite happy to argue that
the parties might not intend a partnership, but that this rule "has no application where
creditors or other third parties are involved." Supplemental Argument on Behalf of Appel-
lant at 20, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1962) (No. A-
8984). For these parties, "it is their status that is controlling and not their intention." Id. at
21. Youngstown said it again in its petition for rehearing: It argued that the "only thing that
could possibly distinguish" its case from other mining-partnership cases was the express
disclaimer, but "this contract is binding as between the parties to it, but is not binding on
third parties in any way or to any extent. This is elementary." Petitioner's Motion for Re-




The Texas joint-venture cases fail to support an absolute barrier to an
operator's fiduciary duty to its investors in another way. Even when faced
with disclaimers, these courts often looked for acts of joint participation
on the assumption that such acts could override the disclaimers and make
the operator a fiduciary.46 They performed a factual analysis that would
be irrelevant if Article V.A. or VII.A., or other JOA terms, bar a fiduci-
46. In Youngstown, discussed briefly above in notes 42 and 45, the court found for
nonoperators in yet another materialman's claim. The agreement provided that "[tlhe
Joint Leases shall not be operated hereunder as a partnership venture, and the liability of
the parties ... shall be several and not joint or collective." 355 S.W.2d at 241. It also gave
the operator "'exclusive charge, control and supervision of all operations of every kind,"'
id., though it allowed some control because nonoperators had to approve any expenses
over $5,000. T'he supply company initially claimed to have booked supplies to accounts for
the individual owners, that it had not even seen the operating agreement, and that it would
not have sold supplies just based on the operator's credit. Id. at 242-43. Although the court
decided this liability question as a matter of law against the vendor based upon its interpre-
tation of the operating agreement, it did not give the disclaimer conclusive weight. Instead,
it found no partnership only because there was "no other evidence sufficient to sustain a
finding of partnership." Id. at 245. The court stressed that the agreement and the record
established neither any sign of "joint operation of the leases nor mutual agency of the
parties." Id. Had their been joint operations, the court apparently would have looked be-
yond the contract terms.
In Truck Lines, a case with a partnership disclaimer, the appellants argued that the writ-
ten agreements showed, as a matter of law, that nonoperator Texaco was in a partnership
arrangement. Perhaps for this reason, the court focused primarily on the contract dis-
claimer and the fact that it "negatives any intention to create a partnership." 337 S.W.2d at
500. However, even this was in the third-party context, as this conclusion was followed
immediately by: "The contract did not authorize Richardson to create any liability to third
parties binding on Texaco." Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, the court discussed facts
showing that the nonoperator did not participate in the pertinent activity, negotiations for
building the road. It held that "[nleither the written contract ... nor the manner of carry-
ing out said contract show as a matter of law that they were mining partners or joint ven-
turers." Id. at 499.
In Rucks v. Burch, 156 S.W.2d 975 (Tex. 1941), the Texas Supreme Court focused on the
lack of joint participation, id. at 976 ("There is absolutely no evidence that either Rucks or
Middleton were to participate in the drilling operation."), but it is unclear whether it would
have done so even with disclaimers, because the opinion does not cite any restrictive lan-
guage. So too in Wagner Supply Co. v. Bateman, 18 S.W.2d 1052 (Tex. 1929), the court
discussed such acts as joint operation and mutual agency, but without any discussion of
disclaimer or exculpatory clauses. Id. at 1055-56.
In Archer v. Bill Pearl Drilling Co., 655 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ
dism'd), a drilling company tried to extend liability for drilling-pipe damage to an investor.
The court reviewed the operating agreement but found determinative that the defendant
had "exercised no right to participate in the control or operation of the venture." Id. at
344. It did not discuss any exculpatory or limiting clauses. For another fairly oft-cited case
in which the court found no liability to a vendor because there was no nonoperator control
or participation in management, but never indicated whether there was an operating agree-
ment or, if so, what it was, see Dunbar v. Olson, 110 N.E.2d 664, 665-66 (111. App. Ct.
1953).
In Bolivar v. R & H Oil and Gas Co., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Miss. 1991), the estate
of a Mississippi resident who died from a blowout tried to extend wrongful death liability
to an investor but the court rejected that effort because of the lack of mutual control.
Apparently the parties did not have any written contract. Id. at 1379.
Gardner v. Wesner, 55 S.W.2d 1104 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1932, writ ref'd), though
containing some general language about mining partnerships, decided whether net profits
interests give rise to mining partnerships. Id. at 1106-07. The control issue was not devel-
oped in Root v. Tomberlin, 36 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1931, writ ref'd) be-
cause the failure to complete a producing well meant that the contemplated operating
contract never was executed. Id. at 601-02.
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ary duty as a matter of law.4 7 Just what this factual analysis means for
internal operator/nonoperator cases is unclear because acts of control can
be relevant to the defense of estoppel. Thus, acts of participation might
be relevant to the third-party cases, but not to internal disputes. The
opinions do not develop this difference, however, and analyses that look
factually at acts of participation are flatly inconsistent with recent cases
finding that the JOA's disclaimers and exculpatory clauses preclude fidu-
ciary duties as a matter of law.
48
The upshot of the joint-venture cases is that for many years operators
risked being found liable as fiduciaries in states other than Texas, in spite
of the JOA; and even in Texas they might be able to overcome Articles
VII.A. and V.A. with appropriate proof of control over the joint
operation.
It is hard to tell whether the Texas Supreme Court felt that acts of participation and the
like could create a fiduciary relationship in one case where the court did not seem to look
outside the contract, Luling Oil & Gas Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref Co., 191 S.W.2d 716 (Tex.
1945), because neither side seems to have cited any evidence outside the contract. The
court's discussion accordingly focused just on contract terms.
In Munsey v. Mills & Garitty, 115 Tex. 469, 283 S.W. 754 (1926), there seems to have
been little dispute that a partnership existed, just a fight over its scope. So the discussion
of the operator's many acts of participation do not shed light on the larger standard.
47. Another example would be Hamilton v. TXO, 648 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which a nonoperator had tried to avoid nonconsent penal-
ties (imposed for not having consented to well completion) by arguing that the operator
had breached fiduciary duties. The parties had a standard JOA. Id. at 319. The court
matched its facts to Ayco's, which it described as a case where the nonoperators were
"wholly excluded from participation in the drilling, operating and control." Id. at 321. It
approvingly noted that Hamilton was also kept from participating because TXO "had full
control of all operations." Id. The opinion later listed the standard exculpatory language
in section 5 of the JOA, id. at 324; presumably section "5" would be Article V.A. of the
standard JOA. The court did not discuss evidence of any efforts Hamilton had made to
participate, so presumably there had been none. Though the court also considered the fact
that the JOA made the parties severally liable, it listed this only after it had described the
lack of any evidence of control. Id. ("[T]he parties were severally, not jointly, liable under
Sections 5 and 22 of the J.O.A."). Had any JOA Article been dispositive, however, the
court could have jettisoned its analysis of legal rights to control or acts of control.
Another case coming out in the same nonfiduciary place as Ayco and Hamilton, but
following their lead only after a factual analysis is James v. Nico Energy Corp., 838 F.2d
1365, 1373 (5th Cir. 1988). Alternatively, Taylor v. GWR Operating Co., 820 S.W.2d 908
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied), did not follow Ayco and Hamilton
largely because the operator had initiated the lawsuit to recover unpaid costs and had itself
pled a fiduciary duty. Id. at 911-12. Having done so, it became its own greatest barrier
against getting summary judgment on the nonoperator's claims.
48. Another category of cases where the issue at stake drives the outcome are the
securities cases. A joint venture can be a defense to certain securities claims, so in these
instances the operator may somewhat comically trade horses and claim a joint venture to
avoid securities liability. Courts concerned with preserving what look like meritorious se-
curities claims may adopt a more stringent reading of joint-venture requirements than they
do in the vendor context. As an example, see Anderson v. Vinson Exploration, Inc., 832
S.W.2d 657, 663-64 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied), in which the court noted evi-
dence that the operator had "ultimate control" and even cited Ayco and Rankin, yet none-
theless held that a fact issue existed on whether a joint venture existed. Thus, the interest
to be protected seems to vary the judicial scrutiny.
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B. MANY MINING-PARTNERSHIP CASES SIMILARLY OVERCAME THE
Two JOA CLAUSES AND ADDRESSED THE
FIDUCIARY ISSUE DIRECTLY
The joint-venture cases are by no means the only cases in which courts
brushed by the JOA's liability limiting clauses. The mining-partnership
cases show the same pattern. This is hardly surprising because these two
avenues to making operators fiduciaries are identical in most regards. 49
Courts ruling on the operator's duty cite cases from the two lines of au-
thority interchangeably, as in the Ayco decision.
A number of courts have found operators to be mining partners and,
therefore, fiduciaries under ordinary JOAs, without letting Article V.A.
or VII.A. block them from imposing this high duty. As with the joint-
venture cases, some courts treat the fiduciary question as a matter of law;
others engage in a three-part factual analysis effectively indistinguishable
from the three-part joint-venture analysis. 5n As with joint-venture cases,
the mining-partnership opinions that ultimately hold their particular op-
erator not a fiduciary often reach that conclusion only after a full three-
factor analysis. In doing so, they indicate that the JOA's two liability-
limiting clauses are not enough to disavow fiduciary responsibility conclu-
sively, or, for that matter, to limit the operator's obligations in the area in
dispute.
Sparks Bros. Drilling Co. v. Texas Moran Exploration51 is a good exam-
ple of this. A driller sued nonoperator Texas Moran, in addition to the
operator, to recover on unpaid bills. Though the Oklahoma Supreme
Court did not describe the operating agreement in much detail, it indi-
cated that the contract provided that liability was several, not joint; that it
was not to be construed as a mining partnership; and that it gave the
operator "full and direct control" of operations-all terms like the
JOA's. 52 The court then discussed whether the parties had a fiduciary
49. For the three-part test as applied to mining partnerships, see 2 HOWARD WIL-
LIAMS & CHARLES MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, § 435, at 504.1-.3 (2001); 2 EUGENE
KuNTZ, A TREATISE N THE LAw OF OIL ANi) GAS § 19A.6, at 109-10 (1993 & Supp. 2002).
50. Many other cases, predictably, do not give details of whatever agreement applied;
some seem not to have had an operating agreement. See Wagner Supply Co. v. Bateman,
18 S.W.2d 1052 (Tex. 1929) (driller who acquired a one-fourth "royalty interest" for com-
pleting well treated as mining partner vis-a-vis vendor, but no details of his contract; given
that Bateman was a driller/investor, the odds are higher that the parties did not use a form
operating agreement); Mountain Iron & Supply Co. v. Branson, 8 P.2d 407, 408 (Kan.
1932) (lead case holding defendants liable as mining partners for material and supplies, but
based on oral agreement); Mud Control Labs. v. Covey, 269 P.2d 854, 857-59 (Utah 1954)
(holding defendants liable for materials as mining partners after they had entered a Joint
Operating Agreement, but few of its "17 pages" of terms listed; and indicating that agree-
ment to limit liability would not be binding on third parties); Sparks v. Midland Supply
Co., 339 P.2d 1056 (Okla. 1959) (holding nonoperator jointly liable as mining partner to
supply company when he signed drilling contract, held joint ownership of leases, had
agreement entitling him to production, and had detailed contacts with supply company; but
no indication of any larger operating or other agreement or of any liability limiting
clauses).
51. 829 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1991).
52. Id. at 952.
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relationship (if so, the nonoperators would have to pay for services pro-
vided to the well) 53 without any hint that the partnership disclaimer con-
clusively barred liability. Ultimately, it reversed the court of appeals and
found no mining partnership, but only because the facts did not show
enough "cooperation" to prove the third element of a mining partner-
ship. 54 The existence of this fiduciary duty was a fact issue,55 not a ques-
tion of law decided negatively because of a disclaimer.
Another example of the mainstream factual analysis is Blocker Explo-
ration Co. v. Frontier Exploration, Inc.56 After the operator went bank-
rupt, a company that performed seismic tests sued the nonoperator on a
mining-partnership theory. Applying the standard three-part test, the
Colorado Supreme Court extensively reviewed precedent, particularly on
the "joint operations" prong.57 The court did not list all the terms of the
parties' governing agreement, 58 but it relied on a number of cases dealing
with the general mining-partnership test, many of which interpreted the
AAPL's ubiquitous JOA.59 Ultimately, the court held that the nonoper-
ator did not have enough participation to be liable as a mining partner. It
did not rely either on an Article V.A.-type clause or an Article VII.A. no-
partnership disclaimer. Instead, it endorsed the very factual approach
that courts should determine if there was an "active role in the conduct of
operations"; if not, they should determine whether the agreement creates
"a right of participation in the management or control of the operation"
(in which case even unexercised rights might sustain liability). 60 Sparks
53. For a general treatment of nonoperators' liability for services under Oklahoma
law, see Watts, supra note 16.
54. See Sparks, 829 P.2d at 953-54 ("The acts of Texas Moran are not sufficient to
prove cooperation in the drilling of the 1-29.").
55. Id. Two Justices dissented, but not because of the disclaimer; they believed the
facts did establish a mining partnership. The Oklahoma Supreme Court followed Sparks.
See Schulte v. Apache Corp., 949 P.2d 291, 297 (Okla. 1995) (finding no mining partnership
because no evidence of participation or intent to form partnership, without any discussion
of JOA barriers in case with unidentified JOA).
56. 740 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1987).
57. Id. at 985-87 (citations omitted).
58. The parties entered a lease assignment that set out nonoperator Blocker's interest
and cost responsibility, but in general referred to an earlier lease assignment between the
operator and its predecessor, which in turn had appended an unexecuted operating agree-
ment. Id. at 984.
59. As seems almost de rigeur, and is perhaps a casualty of appellate courts' penchant
for sticking to high principle and ignoring tawdry factual details, far too many of the fre-
quently cited mining partnership cases give little or no detail on the operative agreement,
much less a discussion of any exculpatory or liability-limiting clauses. See, e.g., Bovaird
Supply Co. v. McClement, 177 N.E.2d 430, 435 (111. App. Ct. 1961) (finding no "actual
express business partnership," and apparently no written agreement, in vendor case finding
no partnership).
60. See Blocker, 740 P.2d at 987. In adopting this position, the Colorado Supreme
Court tried to reconcile the mass of inconsistent cases about how much proof is needed to
prove "cooperation." Is a legal right to participate determinative, or is actual participation
required, and if the latter, are routine and fairly passive acts like reviewing leases and
invoices enough to show cooperation? The court ultimately decided that such rights as
receiving information, having access to the drilling site, and being consulted were not
enough to show that the nonoperator "actively controlled the exploration." Id. at 986, 988.
As these are rights quite similar to those in the JOA, they suggest that the court would
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and Blocker illustrate the principle that Articles V.A. and VII.A. no more
automatically diverted mining-partnership responsibilities in the tradi-
tional interpretation than they diverted joint-venture duties.
C. THE OPERATOR'S FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THREE ROUTINE
ACTIVITIES-OPERATING UNITIZED PROPERTY, HANDLING JOINT
ACCOUNT FUNDS, AND MARKETING PRODUCTION-IGNORES THE
LIABILITY LIMITING CLAUSES
Joint-venture and mining-partnership theories have been the main bat-
tleground over the operator's duty, but many courts have carved out fidu-
ciary theories as a matter of law for selected activities. These cases, too,
show that many courts do not let either Article VII.A. or V.A. derail a
heightened duty.
1. Young and the Unit Operator Theory
A doctrine that long has generated fiduciary obligations in spite of the
JOA's disclaimers and exculpatory limits is the unit-operator doctrine. A
unit operator has the same general role as the ordinary operator, but gen-
erally for a larger territory. A unit is composed of small properties com-
bined (ideally, to gain economies of scale and avoid waste) in a larger
legal unit administered by a single operator.61 "Fiduciary principles ap-
reject the view that the JOA's rights of participation suffice without some acts of participa-
tion. But the willingness to look at actual behavior also suggests that the court did not view
JOA clauses as conclusive barriers to fiduciary duties.
61. Unitized properties are mineral interests combined in an area that bounds a pro-
ducing formation:
Although the terms "pooling" and "unitization" are frequently used inter-
changeably, more properly "pooling" means the bringing together of small
tracts sufficient for the granting of a well permit under applicable spacing
rules whereas "unitization," or, as it is sometimes described, "unit opera-
tion," means the joint operation of all or some part of a producing reservoir.
6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 49, § 901, at 1-2. The terms are used interchangeably.
See, e.g., Gerard J.W. Bos & Co. v. Harkins & Co., 883 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1989)
("[Tihere is little distinction between field-wide utilization and single-unit pooling.").
Unitization generally is sought to avoid waste. It should benefit both lessor and lessee.
See generally 4 KUNTZ, supra note 49, at 188. Such combinations may even be "essential"
to develop a property. Id. at 187. Even though the case for unitization often may be eco-
nomically compelling, it may prove difficult to get all parties to voluntarily agree to de-
velop their properties jointly. See 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 49, § 910, at 85-86.
Some may want to gamble that their properties are more valuable than surrounding
properties and resist combination. Id. at 85. For this reason, states enacted compulsory
unitization statutes. Williams and Meyers have recounted this history. Id. § 912. For the
history of compulsory pooling, which began with controls at the municipal level, see id.
§ 905.1. Some courts also impose pooling under the doctrine of "equitable pooling," in
which they imply powers like the compulsory pooling power from general regulatory stat-
utes. id. § 906.
Whether unitization comes about by agreement or by operation of state law, the change
leads to entry of a unit and unit operating agreement, two contracts that then control the
structure of operations. Standard unit operating agreements have clauses very similar to
Articles V.A. and VII.A. See infra note 68. Unitization causes at least two major manage-
ment changes: (1) a single operator will be forced onto nonoperators who may have had no
role in its selection; and (2) combining a larger group of nonoperators dilutes each no-
noperator's vote.
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pear to be applicable to the relationship of the operator under a pooling,
unitization or joint operating agreement and persons having interests in
the premises affected by such agreement. 62
The lead case for treating the unit operator as a fiduciary is almost half
a century old. In Young v. West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit,63 a royalty
owner case but one that the court announced could apply to working in-
terests as well, royalty owners in a producing unit sued for alleged un-
derpayment of their share of the unit's oil. Thus this was an internal
dispute, not a third-party claim. The operator was delivering the oil under
pre-unitization contracts, but allegedly could have found a higher price in
the marketplace. In holding the operator bound to pay the highest price
available, the court pointed to the nonoperators' lack of control over oil
sales as a critical factor.64 Because the law applying to the unit "afforded
62. 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 49, § 990, at 869-70.
63. 275 P.2d 304 (Okla. 1954), appeal dismissed, 345 U.S. 909 (1955). In a later opin-
ion, West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit v. Young, 325 P.2d 1047 (Okla. 1958), the court
clarified the prices that should be used to determine the underpaid royalties. Howard Wil-
liams' discussion of Young in his 1962 article helped bolster the case's prominence. See
Howard Williams, The Fiduciary Principle In the Law of Oil and Gas, 13 INST. ON OIL &
GAS L. & TAX'N 201, 264-66 (1962).
64. The court claimed that "by statute" the mineral right owners "lose the right to
produce or control the disposition of the production from the particular tract and that right
passes exclusively to the unit organization." See Young, 275 P.2d at 308. It stressed that the
unit statute deprived the plaintiffs of the right to develop their properties themselves or,
seemingly, to control their production. Id. at 306 ("This deprived the various lessees of any
further right or authority or duty to operate their respective leased premises, or to produce
oil therefrom."). The unitization statute compelled mineral owners to
surrender all their right to produce and take oil from the particular tract ...
[owners] lose the right to produce or control the disposition of the produc-
tion from the particular tract and that right passes exclusively to the unit
organization .... And upon unitization the landowner lessors lost their right
to have their contracted lessees develop and produce their individually
owned acreage for the joint benefit of lessor and lessee .... Thus by statute
when a tract of land becomes a part of a field brought under unitized man-
agement the owners of the mineral rights and interests in such particular
tract lose the right to produce or control the disposition of the production
from the particular tracts and that right passes exclusively to the unit
organization.
Id. at 308. Other parts of the opinion seem to stress the mineral owners' general loss of
control, not their inability to market production from their original leases, the issue in
dispute. Id. at 309 ("The law applicable to this unitization required no notice to royalty
owners and afforded them no voice in the organization or management of the unit or in the
selection of the unit operator.").
In reality, the unit "plan," which is the contractual agreement implementing the unit
statute's dictates, seems to have let at least some interest owners take their production in
kind, so perhaps the royalty owners could have sold the production attributable to their
share of the unit (even if it would not literally have been taken from their particular
leases). Id. (citing portion of unit plan that begins "[t]o the extent that any person entitled
to take and receive in kind any portion of the Unit Production"). Take-in-kind rights for
royalty owners, the plaintiffs in Young, are more common in oil leases than in gas leases;
these properties were "productive of oil and gas," id. at 306, and it is hard to see why the
court would cite the take-in-kind language unless it applied to Young's royalty owners.
Surely the court did not believe that the relevant loss of control was the inability to take
possession of the particular hydrocarbons produced from the royalty owners' property,




no voice in the organization or management of the unit or in the selection
of the unit operator," the unit operator "stands in a position similar to
that of a trustee. ' 65 As noted above, Young is a royalty case, but the
Tenth Circuit extended the holding to working interest owners as well (to
"all who are interested in the oil production either as lessees or royalty
owners").66
Some courts have traced the unit operator's fiduciary duty to the unit
statute, rather than the parties' contract. 67 Unitization statutes, however,
generally are implemented by unit operating agreements, and these tend
to have disclaimers and limitations just like the standard JOA.68 Many
courts have followed Young to make unit operators fiduciaries, in work-
ing interest and royalty cases, and they too, presumably, often applied
unit agreements with such terms.69
A key question is whether the significant loss of control is measured by the overall oper-
ator/nonoperator relationship, or only by the relative balance of rights concerning the mat-
ter in dispute. If the former, operators are likely to be under a general duty that is set as a
matter of law; if the latter, their duty is more likely to turn on a factual analysis that will
vary by category of activity.
65. Id. at 309. Once it had decided that it would treat the operator like a trustee, the
court predictably found trust standards violated. The operator paid royalty owners one
price even though a better price was available. It had to account to the unit owners "at the
highest market price available at the time of such production." Id. at 310. This holding
applied, at least, when the owners had not received their share in kind or authorized ship-
ment to a particular purchaser. Id.
66. Id. at 309.
67. See, e.g., Leck v. Cont'l Oil Co., 800 P.2d 224, 229 (Okla. 1989) ("This is not a duty
created by the lease agreement but rather by the unitization order and agreement.").
68. There are standard unit operating agreements just as there are standard JOAs.
The 1970 version of the American Petroleum Institute's model-form unit agreement, for
instance, had language very much like the pre-1989 JOA's several liability and no-partner-
ship language. API, 1970 Model Form Unit Agreement § 137.6, Article 14.1, reprinted in 7
KUNTZ, supra note 49, at 202. The companion API model-form Unit Operating Agreement
had the JOA's good-and-workmanlike language of prudency, and a limitation of liability to
gross negligence or willful misconduct, API, 1970 Unit Operating Agreement § 13.7, Arti-
cles 7.1-.2, reprinted in 7 KUNTZ, supra note 49, at 220, although the operator did have a
higher duty to consult with interest owners and an at-least lukewarm duty to "keep them
informed of all matters" (strong language) "which Unit Operator, in the exercise of its best
judgment, considers important" (immediately watered down), id. The operating agree-
ment even contained a redundant (given the unit agreement) several liability/no-partner-
ship paragraph. Id. § 14.1, reprinted in 7 KUNrZ, supra note 49, at 225. The API's model-
form unit agreement for field-wide units also had an Article VII.A. clone. API, Model
Form of Agreement for Statutory Unitization § 12.1, reprinted in 7 KUNTZ, supra note 49,
at 246. The parallel unit operating agreement had both Article V.A. and VII.A. language.
Id., Articles 7.1-.2, 13.1, reprinted in 7 KUNTZ, supra note 49, at 264, 268-69. There is no
reason to think that such common, familiar boilerplate was not in the Young operating
agreement as well.
69. Post-Young cases can be divided into working interest cases following Young as a
unit rule; royalty owner cases following Young as a unit rule; and cases citing Young for a
general operator fiduciary duty without acknowledging it as a unit rule. Some of the cases
are ordinary working interest cases citing Young with approval for the rule that unit opera-
tors are fiduciaries. Here the most recent is ENI v. Samson Investment Co., 977 P.2d 1086
(Okla. 1999), in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court confirmed that unit agreements give
rise to fiduciary duties, but also held that the agreement "defines the limits of the duty"
and did not extend to a duty to notify of acquisition of future interests. Id. at 1088-89.
There are other cases discussing Young. See Reserve Oil, Inc. v. Dixon, 711 F.2d 951, 953
n.4 (10th Cir. 1983) (working interest owners suing over operator's improper distribution
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of production revenues in lead case establishing trustee-type duty, citing Young for rule
that "operator of a unitized oil field stands in a position similar to that of a trustee");
Shearn v. Ward Petroleum Corp., 808 F. Supp. 1530, 1532 (W.D. Okla. 1992) (citing Young,
as well as Reserve Oil and other cases for proposition that "a unit operator stands in a
fiduciary or trustee-type status as to the interest owners in a well" in unit interest owner
lawsuit for distribution of production proceeds); see also Garfield v. True Oil Co., 667 F.2d
942, 944 (10th Cir. 1982) (citing Young as unit case but finding it inapplicable to net profit
holders' dispute over handling of field equipment and over production sales to affiliate).
But see Doheny v. Wexpro, 974 F.2d 130, 135 (10th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing Young as
statutory case and refusing to apply fiduciary duty in unit interest owners' gas balancing
dispute when neither agreement nor statute created duty sought by owners); Conoco v.
J.M. Huber Corp., 148 F. Supp. 1157, 1170-73 (D. Kan. 2001) (finding fiduciary duty under
Oklahoma law, citing Young among other cases, but not extending it to duty to provide
information to interest owner of "dealings with DOE and its regulations" in case over
reimbursement Conoco sought for past payments to interest owners on unlawful stripper
price), affd, 289 F.3d 819 (10th Cir. 2002).
In Andrau v. Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 712 P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1986), something of
an oddball working interest case, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that there was no
fiduciary duty requiring a unit operator to exercise its contractual powers to foreclose a
lien in the "least onerous" way. The defendant had not paid all well costs. It took the
position that the operator, as a fiduciary, had a duty to reduce its unpaid bill by crediting
the investor's underproduced gas at the high price the operator received under its own
contracts. Id. at 373-74. In other words, an investor that did not have the foresight to enter
a high-priced, long-term gas sales agreement was trying to free-ride on the operator's pru-
dence in handling its own production. It is not clear whether the Wyoming Supreme Court
agreed that unit operators are fiduciaries as a matter of law or not. The indebted plaintiff
had cited Young, as well as Beadle v. Daniels, 362 P.2d 128 (Wyo. 1961) and Reserve Oil, to
argue that it was "well-accepted that a Unit Operator stands in the position of a fiduciary
or trustee to nonoperators." Andrau, 712 P.2d at 374. The court distinguished Young be-
cause its interest owners purportedly had been compelled by statute "to surrender all
rights to produce from the unit." Id. at 375. It treated Young, therefore, as a statutory loss-
of-control case; and distinguished Reserve Oil as involving a narrow trustee-type duty not
in issue. Citing authority that fiduciary obligations can be limited contractually, the court
held that the clear alternative lien foreclosure provisions in the agreement gave the opera-
tor the right to foreclose in any manner it chose. Andrau thus does not rest, at least not
plainly or unambiguously, on a finding of whether a fiduciary duty exists or not. The court
did not explain whether it rejected the view that unit operators always are fiduciaries, or
just believed that the duty was not as broad as alleged. Id. at 374 ("While these cases do
support appellant's contention that there is often a fiduciary or trustee-type relationship
between operator and nonoperator owners, they do not provide support for the fiduciary
duty appellant claims is owed in this case .... [The operating agreement] expressly negates
such a duty.") (emphasis added); id. at 377 ("The claimed fiduciary duty does not exist.")
(emphasis added). The Tenth Circuit followed Andrau under Wyoming law, finding no
fiduciary duty, because it found "the terms of the [unidentified] agreement not expressly or
impliedly giving rise to one." Connaghan v. Maxus Exploration Co., 5 F.3d 1363, 1365
(10th Cir. 1993).
A number of royalty owner cases follow Young. See, e.g., Pritchett v. Forest Oil Corp.,
535 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Shutts v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 732 P.2d 1286, 1298 (Kan. 1987); Leck v. Cont'l Oil Co., 800 P.2d 224, 229
(Okla. 1989), applied after certified question decided, 971 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1992); Finley
v. Marathon Oil Co., 75 F.3d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir. 1996); Roberts Ranch Co. v. Exxon, 43 F.
Supp. 1252, 1263-66 (W.D. Okla. 1997); cf. Goodall v. Trigg Drilling Co., 944 P.2d 292, 295,
295-97 (Summers, C.J., concurring) (urging Oklahoma Supreme Court, in an overriding
royalty case, to define nature of royalty relationship, and citing Young among other cases
in urging quasi-fiduciary standard). But see Arco v. Farm Credit Bank, 226 F.3d 1138, 1161-
63 (10th Cir. 2000) (declining to follow Young under Colorado law); id. at 1162 n.12 (citing
Gary Catron, The Operator's 'Fiduciary' Duty to Royalty and Working Interest Owners, 64
OKLA. B.J. 2763 (1993), for the proposition that the Young rule is limited to Oklahoma-a
narrow reading that this footnote shows is incorrect); Gerard J.W. Bos & Co. v. Harkins &
Co., 883 F.2d 379, 381-82 (5th Cir. 1989) (refusing to apply Young under Mississippi law in
suit over cancellation of take-or-pay contract where court found that unit operator's au-
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One reason Young is so interesting is that it shows that the standard
courts sometimes use to deny fiduciary responsibility in joint-venture and
mining-partnership disputes, the interest owners' lack of control, actually
should be a reason to find a heightened duty when dealing with the inter-
nal relations between operator and nonoperator. It makes sense, of
course, when considering claims by vendors and other third parties
against the joint account, to only allow liability against nonoperators if
they did something to incur the expense. Ordinarily, those supplying ser-
vices and equipment to an oilfield project do not rely on the nonoper-
ators' credit. But if nonoperators have been actively involved, the
outsider might reasonably have relied on their credit and assurances. In
this context, it is fair to use participation and control as a test of liabil-
ity.70 In relations between investors and their operator, however, the
unit-operator doctrine extends extra protection because the operator's
wide range of discretionary activity gives it an unusual amount of power
over the investors' interests, a power that is very hard to oversee. In the
thority did not include marketing production). Because standard leases do not have terms
similar to Article V.A. or VI.A., this Article does not address those cases further.
Young has been cited as a general fiduciary rule, without being limited to units. See Teel
v. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 P.2d 391, 396 & n.9 (Okla. 1985) (citing Young in interest owner
accounting case for general proposition that, when cotenants name one of their group as
operator, "they become coadventurers in the enterprise and stand in a fiduciary relation-
ship to one another"); Coosewoon v. Meridian Oil Co., 25 F.3d 920, 931 (10th Cir. 1994)
(citing Young for operator's fiduciary duty to get highest market price for royalty owners);
Harding v. Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466, 471 (W.D. Okla. 1963) (citing Young for trust obli-
gation to get best price when buying production at gas compressor). But see Davis v. TXO
Prod. Corp., 929 F.2d 1515, 1519 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing not Young, but Teel, with apparent
approval of "an implied covenant" of good faith "arising from a recognized fiduciary duty"
between cotenants, without mentioning unit issue, but finding that nonoperator's state-
ments against operator's unit plan did not violate any provision of operating agreement).
One bold author has argued that Young is not really good authority for a fiduciary rule.
In an exotic 1993 reading of Oklahoma law, Gary Catron argued that the outcome "may
not have depended on the establishment of a fiduciary obligation." Catron, supra note 69,
at 2765. He did not show how his reading can be reconciled with the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's strong language: "The unit organization with its operator stands in a position simi-
lar to that of a trustee for all who are interested in the oil production either as lessees or
royalty owners." Young, 275 P.2d at 309. To read Young without its fiduciary rationale is
like driving from Dallas to Tulsa without using roads.
As with some other fiduciary duties, so with the Young doctrine, the most reluctant
courts may be in Texas. Young has not been applied to any working interest disputes in
Texas, and the Fifth Circuit rejected a royalty fiduciary duty in a unitized property under
Texas law. Rutherford v. Exxon, 855 F.2d 1141, 1145 (5th Cir. 1988). In Rutherford, the
lessors sued claiming that they had been fraudulently induced to agree to unitization by
misrepresentations about the benefits of combining their properties, only to see their post-
unitization production drop sharply. They tried to avoid limitations by claiming that Ex-
xon's breach of its fiduciary duty prevented limitations from accruing. The court, in re-
jecting that claim, argued that Texas law does not create fiduciary duties from lessor or
unitization status. Id. at 1145-46. Though the case involved only royalty interests, Young
claimed that the unit fiduciary rule applied to royalty and working interest relations. The
Fifth Circuit seems to have rejected unitization as a source of fiduciary liability generally as
far as Texas law is concerned.
70. Joint liability on this basis still could be too broad, because the only participation
that should be relevant to a third party would be conduct that normally forms a basis for
estoppel-joint participation on which the third party relies. Nonetheless, there is at least a
rationale in third-party liability cases that participation often could be relevant.
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internal setting, lack of control is a reason for finding liability, not for
excusing it.
2. The Reserve Oil Trust Fund Theory
The second of the other fiduciary theories is the Reserve Oil trust the-
ory, which the Tenth Circuit originated in Reserve Oil, Inc. v. Dixon.71
Again the duty arose from an internal dispute. The Tenth Circuit did not
identify the specific operating agreement, but the language it cited tracks
the JOA. 72 The operator, Dixon, sold production belonging to Reserve
Oil, an interest owner, and then used the funds to pay its operating costs
and to cover the shares of other owners.73 Reasoning that the operating
agreement gave each owner title to its own production and that nothing
authorized the operator to commingle their money, the Tenth Circuit
held that the operator had a trust responsibility over the investor's
money.74 "[T]his contract created a trustee type relationship imposing a
duty of fair dealing between the operator and the non-operator owners in
the matter of distribution of shares among the owners. ' 75 This holding
could not be correct if Article VII.A. blocked all fiduciary responsibility,
or a clause like Article V.A. reduced the operator's liability for all of its
acts to the implausible threshold of gross negligence or willful
misconduct.
Though the court left the precise origin of this trust-like duty murky,76
as it did the scope of the heightened responsibility, Reserve Oil has been
cited with approval in a variety of accounting contexts. For instance, in In
re Mahan & Rowsey, Inc., whose guiding JOA was "substantially similar"
to Reserve Oil's,77 an investor sued to recover overbillings after the oper-
ator went bankrupt. The bankruptcy court found Reserve Oil dispositive
and that the agreement created a fiduciary relationship in the collection
of well costs. 78 The district court and Tenth Circuit affirmed without sug-
71. 711 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1983).
72. For instance, the language quoted in paragraph 13 giving the Operator "the right
•.. but not the obligation, to purchase such oil and gas," id. at 952, is a standard term in
Article VI.C. of the 1977 JOA. And the agreement included an accounting procedure in
Exhibit C, the standard JOA arrangement, id. at 953 n.3, containing language that is the
JOA's standard Copas accounting form.
73. Id. at 952.
74. Id. at 952-53.
75. Id. at 953. The court apparently did rely on the no-partnership language in noting
that it did "not mean to imply that there is a general agency relationship as to third parties,
which of course is specifically disavowed in the contract itself." Id. (emphasis added). Thus
it too applied the traditional understanding of what presumably was Article VII.A. (that it
arose to deal with third-party claims). See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
76. The Tenth Circuit cited none of the many prior joint-venture and mining-partner-
ship cases. It did refer to Young, the lead unit operator/fiduciary case, but nothing in the
opinion indicated that the properties were unitized.
77. See In re Mahan & Rowsey, Inc., 35 B.R. 898, 903 (W.D. Okla. 1983), affd on
pertinent grounds, 62 B.R. 46 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985), affd after remand, 817 F.2d 682
(10th Cir. 1987). The Tenth Circuit said that Reserve Oil had "an operating agreement of
the type present in this case." In re Mahan & Rowsey, 817 F.2d at 684.
78. In re Mahan & Rowsey, 35 B.R. at 901-03. The bankruptcy opinion found Articles
V.A. and VII.A. irrelevant in two ways: not only did it apply the trust-like theory as a
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gesting that any JOA Article limited this trust duty. Other cases applying
this doctrine pay just as little attention to liability-restricting clauses.79
Even the industry seems to have conceded this fiduciary duty; the section
on "custody of funds" in the 1989 JOA provides that the paragraph does
not establish a fiduciary relationship toward nonoperators "for any pur-
pose other than to account for Non-Operators funds as herein specifically
provided."8o1 This language signifies the industry's resignation, perhaps
even welcome, to a fiduciary duty when the operator acts as a custodian
of its nonoperators' money. In these cases, as in the unit cases, it is the
operator's full control over investor affairs that creates its extra-contrac-
tual responsibility.
matter of law, but it held that the traditional joint-venture theory raised fact issues, ones
that could not be decided on summary judgment. Id. at 901-02. Had either Article con-
trolled, there would have been no fact issue about fiduciary duty, nor could the operator
have labored under trust-like duties as a matter of law.
79. In Envirogas v. Walker Energy Partners, 641 F. Supp. 1339 (W.D.N.Y. 1986), the
1400 wells had a variety of operating agreements, none spelled out in detail, but presuma-
bly many were standard JOAs. The court found Reserve Oil a "useful analogy" as it con-
cluded that it appeared likely the defending corporations would prove a fiduciary
relationship, id. at 1345; it uttered not a word about Article V.A. or VII.A. See also In re
Antweil, 154 B.R. 982, 985 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1993) (following Reserve Oil to find trustee
duty). Andrau, which acknowledged Reserve Oil but did not let it override specific debt
collection rights, concerned a barely identified Unit Operating Agreement. The court dis-
tinguished Reserve Oil because that court "was simply construing the parties' contract."
712 P.2d at 375. Given the similarity of operating terms and commonality even within unit
agreements, the terms of the agreements may well have been substantially the same. The
Tenth Circuit similarly distinguished Reserve Oil in finding that the gas-balancing obliga-
tion claimed by plaintiffs was not among the "duties outlined in the contract, nor are they
duties that would naturally arise as corollaries to the obligations set forth in the agree-
ment." Doheny v. Wexpro Co., 974 F.2d 130, 134-35 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Conoco v.
J.M. Huber Corp., 148 F. Supp. 1157, 1170-73 (D. Kan. 2001) (finding fiduciary duty under
Oklahoma law, citing Reserve Oil among other cases, but not extending that obligation to
inform interest owner of "dealings with DOE and its regulations" in case over reimburse-
ment Conoco sought for its past payments to interest owners based on unlawful stripper
price), affd, 289 F.3d 819 (10th Cir. 2002).
Because of Reserve Oil's unexplained reliance upon Young's fiduciary rule for unit oper-
ators, several cases have cited its dictum that the unit operator is a fiduciary. See Shearn v.
Ward Petroleum Corp., 808 F. Supp. 1530, 1532 (W.D. Okla. 1992); Leck, 800 P.2d at 228-
29. If the applicable unit operating agreements or statutory terms in these cases contained
clauses like Article V.A. or VII.A., the courts did not mention them.
80. 1989 JOA, supra note 2, Article V.D.4. (emphasis added). The paragraph applies
to funds "advanced or paid to the Operator, either for the conduct of operations hereunder
or as a result of the sale of production from the Contract Area." Id. Commentators ex-
press approval of the duty. See Lynn Hendrix & Staunton Golding, The Standard of Care
in the Operation of Oil and Gas Properties: Does the Operator Owe a Fiduciary Ditty to the
Nonoperators?, 44 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N § 10.04[3][a], at 10-22 to -26 (1993)
(making exception for fiduciary duty "to account for money or property received by the
operator"); Ernest Smith, Duties and Obligations Owed by An Operator To Nonoperators,
Investors, and Other Interest Owners, 32 RoCKY MTN. M!N. L. INST. 12-1, 12-10 to -11
(1986) [hereinafter Smith, Duties and Obligations] (likening this obligation to that of any-
one with duty to "account for money or property received"); Ernest Smith, Duties Owed
by an Operator to a Non-Operator under Voluntary Agreements & Compulsory Orders,
Address at the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 3-9, 3-17 (1997) [hereinafter
Smith, Voluntary Agreements & Compulsory Orders]; Guy Wall, Joint Oil and Gas Opera-
tions in Louisiana, 53 LA. L. REV. 79, 100 (1992).
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3. The Operator as Marketing Fiduciary
A last fiduciary theory disregarding the JOA's two liability shields was
launched in the early 1990s by a Texas court of appeals. In Johnston v.
American Cometra, Inc.,81 the parties had a 1977 JOA. The operator was
a successor to the original operator and apparently did not own an inter-
est in the well.8 2 The working interest owners sued when the operator
failed to pursue a claim for breach of a take-or-pay gas purchase contract.
The nonoperators argued that American Cometra's hiring to "operate
and manage a well for Appellants" made the company their agent and,
therefore, a fiduciary. 83 In response, the operator's brief set out in detail
arguments based on both Article V.A. and VII.A., as well as the claim
that Texas law treats the operating tie as "strictly contractual. '8 4 The
same argument was raised in an amicus brief later filed in the Texas Su-
preme Court by the Texas Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Association. 85
The trial court granted summary judgment for the operator. In revers-
ing and remanding, the court of appeals held that if the operator sold gas
on behalf of the nonoperators, it owed "all those duties owed by an agent
to its principal. '86 The idea that an operator marketing production as-
sumes heightened responsibility over its nonoperators' affairs is a familiar
one, because it also reflects the substantive effect of Young. The Johnston
operator cited a long line of cases holding that "no fiduciary relationship
exists between the operator and the non-operators. '87 Those cases, how-
ever, addressed "the relationship between the operator and third parties"
and were "not dispositive of the duty issues raised by appellants' plead-
ings."'8 8 That limited purpose was not germane to this internal dispute.
Pointing to Article VII.A. and to the delegation of control to the opera-
tor, the court claimed that the "intention of the JOA is to delegate opera-
tional and managerial control to the operator with the intent of shielding
the non-operators from liability. '"89
81. 837 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
82. Appellants' Brief at 2, 31, Johnston v. Am. Cometra, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 711 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1992, writ denied) (No. 03-90-00249-CV) [hereinafter Appellants' Brief,
Johnston v. Cometra]. This presumably was why the nonoperators agreed that "[b]y admis-
sion of all parties, they are not joint venturers." Id. at 32.
83. Id. at 32-34.
84. See Appellee's Brief at 11, 14-16, Johnston v. Am. Cometra, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 711
(Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied) (No. 03-90-00249-CV) (the Article V.A. argument);
id. at 23 (the Article VII.A. argument); id. at 12-13, 18, 23-24 (the Texas law section).
85. Amicus Curiae Brief of Tex. Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Ass'n, Johnston v. Am.
Cometra, Inc. (Tex. 1993) (No. D-3092).
86. See Johnston, 837 S.W.2d at 716.
87. Id. at 715.
88. Id. at 715-16.
89. Id. at 716. The court cited Ernest Smith's well-known 1986 article on the operator's
duty as authority for its conclusion. Id. (citing Smith, Duties and Obligations, supra note
80). Moreover, even if there was no fiduciary duty, American Cometra's failure to protect
its nonoperators' rights could violate its duty as a reasonably prudent operator and its
duties as agent. Id.
Johnston recently has been read to apparently give rise to a duty only to perform in a
workmanlike manner, like any operator, Reeves & Thompson, supra note 5, at 229, but
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Though one way to read Johnston is that the operator is not an overall
fiduciary, but just an agent in one particular activity, marketing produc-
tion, this reading is not sufficient to explain the opinion. For Article
VII.A. in the 1977 JOA provided that the agreement did not form a part-
nership or association and, in addition, that each party would be "liable
only for its proportionate share of the costs of developing and operating
the Contract Area." 90 If this language applied between the parties, as
well as to third-party liability, it should have blocked any fiduciary or
agency liability of American Cometra for failing to make a take-or-pay
claim. Moreover, Article V.A. limited American Cometra's liability to
''gross negligence or willful misconduct." This conflicted with the court of
appeals' conclusion (ironically, drawn from the same paragraph) that
American Cometra could have been liable if it merely failed to act with
reasonable prudence in not making the claim. The court simply did not
apply the exculpatory and disclaimer language to the internal marketing
dispute between this operator and its nonoperators.
A year later, in Arco v. Long Trusts,9' another Texas court of appeals
faced a JOA of the same vintage 92 and agreed that "an agency relation-
ship does arise when an operator is selling gas belonging to a nonoper-
ator."'93 A variety of prominent commentators, as well as several other
courts, have endorsed this agency marketing duty without any suggestion
that the JOA's two liability-limiting paragraphs should cut it off, and the
1989 JOA expressly leaves room for the operator to have this fiduciary
responsibility over revenues received from selling the nonoperators'
production. 94
this reading ignores the rationale of the decision and the agency language that the operator
"owes to the non-operators all those duties owed by an agent to its principal," Johnston,
837 S.W.2d at 716.
90. 1977 JOA. supra note 2, Article VII.A.
91. 860 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied).
92. The language the court did cite from its JOA, the take-in-kind paragraph VI.C., id.
at 442-43, is in the 1977 and 1982 JOAs.
93. Long Trusts, 860 S.W.2d at 445.
94. On commentators' views, see Smith, Duties and Obligations, supra note 80, at 12-
43; Margaret Sullivan, Negotiating Joint Operating Agreements, 23 TEX. STATE BAR SEC-
T]ON REPORT, OIL, GAS & MIN. L. 3,5,9 (1998); Smith, Voluntary Agreements & Compul-
sory Orders, supra note 80, at 3-16 to -17.
Both Johnston and Long Trusts cited work by Ernest Smith on the operator's duty when
marketing production. See, e.g., Johnston, 837 S.W.2d at 714-15 (citing Ernest Smith, Gas
Marketing by Co-Owners: Disproportionate Sales, Gas Imbalances and Lessors' Claims to
Royalty, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 365, 370 (1987), for proposition that operator may act as
agent in selling nonoperators' gas); Long Trusts, 860 S.W.2d at 445 (same). In a subse-
quent case, the court did not give any details of the operating agreement. See Jonalstem,
Ltd. v. Corpus Christi Nat'l Bank, 923 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996,
writ denied) (finding that operator's "act of selling for the other appellants ... made him
their agent," citing Johnston, but in an unusual context in which this holding let the court
dismiss the case on res judicata grounds because the operator's loss in a prior lawsuit
barred plaintiffs' claims). A still later Texas case found the duty inapplicable when the
nonoperators' gas had not been dedicated to the gas purchase contract, so the operator
could amend the gas purchase agreement without violating any fiduciary duty to the plain-
tiffs. Holloway v. Arco, 970 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998, no pet.). In Hollo-
way, the agreement presumably was a standard JOA; the contract had the JOA's pre-1989
[Vol. 56
20031 JUDGING MADE TOO EASY
D. MAJOR ACADEMIC COMMENTATORS USED TO ASSUME THAT THE
OPERATOR'S FIDUCIARY STATUS, THOUGH PERHAPS A FACT
ISSUE, WOULD NOT BE DERAILED BY
BOILERPLATE JOA TERMS
The traditional JOA-fiduciary rule is encapsulated as well in lead arti-
cles by some of the industry's best-known commentators. In 1962, in an
early, detailed review of the operator fiduciary cases, Howard Williams
concluded that "[f]iduciary principles are usually applicable to most
forms of joint endeavor, whether described as a partnership or in less
formal terms. ' 95 He predicted that "[i]t appears a safe prognosis to de-
clare that to an increasing extent we may expect fiduciary principles to be
applied to various relationships involving interests in oil and gas."'96
When Williams discussed the "per cent" or "participating" working inter-
est, he claimed that the relationship "has been said to be one of trust and
confidence amounting to a voluntary trust, '97 and that "co-owners'
groups" with a promoter as operator "may be described in appropriate
cases as a partnership, limited partnership, mining partnership, or as a
joint venture."98 In this way, Williams put the traditional operator/inter-
est owner case in a fiduciary category. 99
"best price obtainable" language, which the court cited as it held that operator Arco might
have breached this contract duty. Id. at 642. But Holloway also did not rely on Articles
V.A. or VII.A. in agreeing that no fiduciary duty existed on these facts.
A federal court approving the national settlement of oil posted-price claims cited both
Long Trusts and Johnston without criticism, but, in approving a settlement that paid out
less for working interest owners than royalty owners, seemingly distinguished them be-
cause they concerned natural gas, not oil. In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 186 F.R.D. 403,
426 (S.D. Tex. 1999). Yet none of the legions of JOA cases suggest that this form contract
imposes one marketing duty on wells that happen to turn up natural gas and another lesser
duty on wells that strike oil. The opinion states that counsel for defending oil companies
claimed that "even if a crude oil JOA Claim were legally feasible (which he believed was
not the case), only a small percentage of the Working Interest Owners would be in a posi-
tion to assert such a claim." Id. Unfortunately, nothing in the opinion indicates the basis
upon which the defense lawyers made that representation.
For the language in the 1989 JOA leaving room for this fiduciary duty, see supra note 80
and accompanying text.
95. Williams, supra note 63, at 274. Williams predicted that:
Wherever the owner of an interest in oil and gas has a power with respect to
another person's interest in oil and gas, the courts are quick to imply a duty
in connection with the exercise of such power. Power begets responsibilities
and duties. A fiduciary principle becomes applicable.
Id. Williams' early article focused heavily on the lessor/lessee relationship, id. at 215-31,
and executive/nonexecutive issues, id. at 239-52, both of which Williams found governed by
something less than a full fiduciary duty.
96. Id. at 274-75.
97. Id. at 237.
98. Id. at 272.
99. Williams did observe that the traditional no-partnership disclaimer "might be
viewed as negating a fiduciary relationship between or among the parties," id., but by not-
ing that its purpose was to avoid joint tort liability and by not giving it extended discussion,
he suggested that it should not be a major factor in fiduciary analysis. Disclaimers did not
claim significant space in his pages.
SMU LAW REVIEW
Writing almost a quarter century after Howard Williams, Ernest Smith
suggested that courts have come to accept that operators in general do fit
the fiduciary mold under joint-venture theory:
One can, I think, safely start with the assumption that in the absence
of other factors modifying the relationship, the operator owes a fidu-
ciary duty to the nonoperators with respect to the ventures contem-
plated by their agreement. This general assumption is justified both
by the broad proposition that anyone who undertakes to act on be-
half of another is, in a general sense, a fiduciary for that person and
by the joint-venture analysis.' 00
Given the prevalence of JOAs, had Professor Smith believed that the
JOA's disclaimer and exculpatory Articles are "other factors" that justify
a lower standard, he most likely would have rewritten his article to claim
that "One can, I think, safely start with the assumption that the operator
is excused by the standard JOA, unless in the presence of unusual lan-
guage or, perhaps, control by the nonoperator. But ordinarily, the opera-
tor will not be a fiduciary." The absence of a standard JOA then would be
one "other factor," albeit a somewhat unusual one, that raises, instead of
lowers, the operator's duties. Professor Smith did argue that the opera-
tor's duty generally should be decided on a case-by-case basis."' He did
not suggest, however, that the industry's boilerplate disclaimers already
decide the issue across most cases and preclude a fiduciary duty.
A third commentator on the operator's duty, Howard Boigon, agreed
in the same period that in almost every state the standard JOA satisfies
the requirements of a joint-venture and its fiduciary trappings. "The JOA,
even in its unaltered form, has been construed by the courts in most
states-with the notable exception of the Texas courts-to create some-
thing more than a passive cotenancy or a mere service contractor
relationship." 102
100. Smith, Duties and Obligations, supra note 80, at 12-14 (emphasis added); see also
id. at 12-5. Smith's full position is somewhat clouded, because he seems to have felt
strongly that parties should be able to contract for a lesser duty, see id. at 12-30 (suggesting
that JOA Article V.A. could relieve operator of liability for breach of specific provisions of
agreement): cf. id. at 12-7 (question whether JOA modifies operator's duty is "not suscepti-
ble of an easy answer"), but one can understand why at least one commentator has put
Smith's article into the strong fiduciary camp, see Patrick Martin, The Joint Operating
Agreement - An Unsettled Relationship?, SWLF SPEcIAL INST. 98, 115 n.39 (1997). Smith's
view that oilfield parties should be able to disclaim fiduciary duties and his preference for a
nuanced factual standard is pronounced in his 1985 article on executive rights. See Ernest
Smith, Implications of a Fiduciary Standard of Conduct for the Holder of the Executive
Right, 64 TEx. L. Rev. 371, 372-75 (1985) (urging standard that "should vary with the
nature and purpose of the transaction").
101. A court in interpreting an operator's duties should not lose sight of [such]
customs and usages .... [T]he appropriate standard applicable to the opera-
tor may range from strict compliance with contractual obligations to obser-
vance of strict fiduciary duties, depending upon the language of the operating
agreement and the context of the dispute.
Smith, Duties and Obligations, supra note 80, at 12-14 (emphasis added).
102. Howard L. Boigon, The Joint Operating Agreement in a Hostile Environment, 38
INST. ON OIL & GAS. L. & TAX'N 5-1, at 5-5 (1987) [hereinafter Boignon, Hostile Environ-
ment]; Howard L. Boigon, Liabilities and Relationships of Co-Owners under Agreements
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These authors could not have treated the operator relationship, which
in American law is tantamount to a JOA relationship in the vast majority
of oilfield projects, as generally fiduciary if they thought the JOA's stan-
dard terms block such a duty. If they meant that the operator owes non-
operating investors a fiduciary duty unless they use the omnipresent JOA,
they would have said so. These major reviews of operator jurisprudence
agreed with dominant case law that the JOA and its terms do not prevent
operators from having a fiduciary duty toward their working interest
investors.
for Joint Development of Oil and Gas Properties, 37 INST. OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 8-1, 8-20
(1986) [hereinafter Boigon, Liabilities and Relationships] ("[Tlhe conduct of operations
under a typical joint operating agreement or other comparable arrangement will likely lead
to findings of fiduciary responsibilities between the co-owners and joint and several liabil-
ity of the co-owners for claims of third parties."); id. at 8-17 ("In fact, apart from such
disclaimers, the typical joint operating agreement appears to contain all the requisite indi-
cia of mining partnerships or joint ventures."). Boigon did qualify his opinion with the
caveat "in states other than Texas." Boigon, Liabilities and Relationships, supra, at 8-20.
While it is true that Texas does not have the depth of fiduciary case law of, say, Oklahoma,
it has not fully rejected the three-part joint-venture or mining-partnership tests. See, e.g.,
Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977). For others reaching roughly the same
conclusions, see Christopher Lane & Catherine Boggs, Duties of Operator or Manager to
its Joint Venturers, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 199, (1983):
The problem ... that [joint operating] relationships pose is that as soon as
any element of control or voice in operational decisions is shared, all the
characteristics of the joint venture or mining partnership are present: (1)
joint ownership; (2) co-operation/joint operation; and (3) agreement to share
profits and losses. Absent a contractual provision to the contrary, it is highly
likely that a court would hold that a joint venture or mining partnership
exists.
Id. at 209.
Parties entering into agreements for joint development of mineral properties
must be aware that they may well be stepping into a new and different
world-the world of the fiduciary-where traditional mining concepts of
competition, hard bargaining, and jealous guarding of information are re-
placed with probate court principles of loyalty, acting for another's benefit,
and full disclosure.
Id. at 238-39. See also DERMAN, supra note 6, at 41, 71-72 (operator may be a mining
partner if mutual control exists); id. at 27-29 (courts have been "reluctant to sanction excul-
patory or indemnity provisions which insulate a party from his own negligence," so gross
negligence disclaimer should be "clear and conspicuous"); id. at 78-83 (discussing dis-
claimer cases); Keefe, supra note 6, at 18-12 & n.34 (courts "generally will impute fiduciary
duty ... unless the agreement specifically provides otherwise" and "some debate" arises
over enforceability of disclaimers).
The most frequently cited article on mining partnerships, by Terry Fiske, did not come
out clearly in favor of disclaimers. See Terry Noble Fiske, Mining Partnership, 26 INST. ON
OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 187, 235-36. Fiske noted that boilerplate disclaimers probably
could not thwart liability to third parties, but that they might have an "unintended conse-
quence," namely, that they "may nullify" a fiduciary link between the parties. Id. at 235.
Disclaimers or express limitations "probably are of limited value" toward third parties, but
"should have greater significance" between the parties. Id. at 235-36.
As shown, some of these articles did mention disclaimers, but they assumed that there is
a live fiduciary duty in most operator cases, an unfounded opinion if standard paragraphs
in the vast majority of operating agreements disclaim or limit such duties. At most, the
question of disclaimers was an unsettled one that might affect individual cases, but not
exculpate operators as a body. This treatment of the issue belongs to the industry's age of
innocence, before the drive to disclaim all tort liability reached its full strength.
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II. SOME COURTS APPLYING THE SAME JOA LANGUAGE IN
THIS TORT-REFORM ERA HAVE LOWERED THE
OPERATOR'S DUTY OF CARE
In recent years, particularly since the early 1990s, some courts have
shifted to a much more restrictive reading of the same JOA terms that
courts had not treated as a per se barrier to fiduciary liability in earlier
years. They have done so using Articles VII.A. and V.A., independently
or in combination, but without acknowledging their change from past in-
terpretations. Commentators reflect this more conservative trend. More-
over, in 1989, the AAPL amended the JOA to more expressly disclaim
tort liabilities, although it left room for a fiduciary duty in the areas of
handling funds and marketing production.
An oft-cited, early example of the revisionist approach is Tenneco v.
Bogert,10 3 a 1986 opinion in which an Oklahoma federal district court
rejected efforts to force the operator to drill an additional well when it
knew of a draining well. In a way it was a silly dispute. Both sides had the
right to propose a new well; the operating agreement did not allocate this
responsibility exclusively to the operator.
The parties almost certainly had a standard JOA, yet the court did not
treat their contract as barring any possible fiduciary duty. Though the
court did not identify the operating agreement, it cited no-partnership
language identical to that in Article VII.A0 4 and a "section 5" that con-
tained JOA Article V.A. language.1 0 5 Oddly, considering its ultimate
holding, the court even called the overall relationship a fiduciary one
("the present joint operating agreement may be seen to create a joint
venture with attendant fiduciary duties").,11 6 Nonetheless, the case then
became what can be called a "fiduciary-but" case as the court used other
parts of the contract to limit the obligation. Arguing that the term "fiduci-
ary" is "bandied-about without precision," the court found the "existence
and extent" of the duties defined (and so limited) by the JOA. 1° 7 Though
Tenneco was suing over the operator's failure to drill an additional well,
the agreement only required the operator to drill a first test well. Any
party could move to drill other wells,H) 8 but because the agreement did
not require the operator to drill additional wells, failing to do so could
not be actionable.11 9 The additional well was outside the contractual field,
103. 630 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
104. Id. at 963 ("The liability of the parties shall be several, not joint or collective.... It
is not the intention of the parties to create, nor shall this agreement be construed as creat-
ing, a mining or other partnership or association, or to render them liable as partners.").
105. Id. at 966 (citing section 5 of the agreement, which stated that the "Operator...
shall conduct all operations in a good and workmanlike manner, but it shall have no liabil-
ity as Operator to the other parties ... except as such may result from gross negligence or
from breach of the provisions of this agreement."). This language about "breach of the
provisions of this agreement" was in the 1956 JOA. See infra note 137.
106. Bogert, 630 F. Supp. at 966-67.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 969.
109. Id.
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which bounded the operator's fiduciary responsibility.' 10
Bogert was not clear on whether the parties had disclaimed their fiduci-
ary duty, or merely limited it to an area where the court felt the contract
dictated the outcome." 'I Moreover, it is one of those mischievous cases in
which the court almost certainly found the substantive argument so unap-
pealing (the court finding it ridiculous that one party with a right to drill a
well could sue another party with an equal right to drill) that it wasn't
concerned about articulating precisely why the duty did not exist. Such is
the danger of dictum. But Bogert is an early outpost for the most con-
servative readings of the JOA.
A number of courts in the years following Bogert have held that the
JOA precludes any fiduciary duty, be it for an activity within the con-
tract's terms or not.112 Many use Article VII.A. They preempt the typical
110. Parts of the opinion, like the discussion of Article V and of the existence of de-
tailed contract obligations, see Bogert, 630 F. Supp. at 966, sound as if the overall duty was
extinguished; others, like the careful review of particular contract terms and a cite to the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTrs about the agreement defining the scope of the duty,
id. at 967, as if the court merely narrowed the duty. The court also found that the operating
agreement did not support claims that the operator should have shared information that
would have let the nonoperator take corrective action. Id. at 967-68.
111. On the immediate question of whether the plaintiff could force the operator to
drill an additional well, the court refused to find that the operator breached any duty by
not drilling a well when any party could propose drilling an offset well. See id. at 968-69.
One subsequent case using Bogert to limit fiduciary duties is True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil
Corp., 771 P.2d 781 (Wyo. 1989). The Wyoming Supreme Court found that the parties had
a fiduciary relationship, id. at 793, and even that the evidence supported the trial court's
finding of a joint venture, id. at 797, but "the rights and duties of the parties are controlled
by their agreement," id. at 793. It then aggressively ignored most of nonoperator Sinclair
Oil's evidence and held that the correct reading of the agreements required reversal of the
trial court's judgment for Sinclair on certain cost issues. Id. at 794-95.
An early case to which many of the "fiduciary-but" cases return is Frankfort Oil Co. v.
Snakard, 279 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 920 (1960). See, e.g., Bogert,
630 F. Supp. at 969. Here, as in Bogert, one claim was that an operator should have drilled
a well when either side could do so, and neither had an obligation to do so. Frankfort Oil,
279 F.2d at 439-42. The court discussed fiduciary standards in reference to the operator's
alleged failure to disclose information. It used very strong language, holding that the "com-
mon undertaking" was "fiduciary in character and required the utmost good faith on the
part of both parties." Id. at 443. Nonetheless, the "extent and effect of such relationship is
determined by the written agreements," and the court found no "contractual obligation" to
disclose the information allegedly concealed. Id.
Other courts find no fiduciary breach because the conduct alleged did not breach any
JOA term or "duties that would naturally arise as corollaries to the obligations set forth in
the agreement." Doheny v. Wexpro Co., 974 F.2d 130, 135 (10th Cir. 1992); accord Davis
v. TXO Prod. Corp., 929 F.2d at 1515, 1519 (10th Cir. 1991); Andrau v. Mich. Wis. Pipe
Line Co., 712 P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1986) (discussed supra note 69).
112. There are other courts that use the several liability or no-partnership language as
grounds to reject a joint venture or mining partnership. See Doheny, 974 F.2d at 134-35
(applying no-partnership and several liability provisions to find no co-tenancy, and then
finding no fiduciary or good-faith duty where gas imbalance claim did not implicate any
particular contract clause); Dime Box Petroleum Corp. v. LL&E, 717 F. Supp. 717, 722 (D.
Colo. 1989) (listing Article VII.A., as well as V.A., in opinion holding in part that JOA
"specifically define[d] the standard by which the operator's conduct is measured"), affd,
938 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1991); Misco-United Supply, Inc. v. Petroleum Corp., 462 F.2d 75,
78, 80 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding disclaimer effective at limiting liability to third parties, even
though parties had amended language to state that it was "[a]s between the parties"); Pren-
tice v. Amax Petroleum Corp., 220 So.2d 783, 787 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (rejecting claim to
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factual analysis by looking solely to this prophylactic Article. These cases
typically ignore Article VII.A.'s limited purpose of foreclosing third-
party claims, and ignore the need to provide a basis for thinking that Ar-
ticle VII.A. should apply between operator and nonoperator.
A second set of revisionist cases relies on Article V.A.'s liability-limit-
ing language. A characteristic graduate of this school is Caddo Oil Co. v.
O'Brien, a 1990 Fifth Circuit opinion in a dispute over certain unpaid well
costs. 1 13 The court rejected the nonoperator's breach of fiduciary duty
claim without any case citation or discussion of purpose. It simply pre-
sumed that Article V.A.'s exculpation applies to all operator conduct.
"Under the terms of the Operating Agreement, the Operator is liable to
share property on joint-venture theory when agreements had no-partnership and several
liability disclaimers): Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 355 S.W.2d 239, 241-45 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1962) (citing, inter alia, separate liability and no-partnership clause (as
well as lack of joint operation) in sustaining summary judgment that no partnership was
created and nonoperators were not liable on vendor claim), affd in relevant part, modified
on other grounds, 363 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1962); U.S. Truck Lines v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d
497, 498-500 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, writ ref'd) (citing no-partnership and several
liability clauses in an opinion that reviewed facts but also held that the agreement itself
"negatives" intention to form partnership and thus sparing nonoperator Texaco from liabil-
ity to road builder); Smith v. L.D. Burns Drilling Co., 852 S.W.2d 40, 41-42 (Tex. App.-
Waco 1993, writ denied) (citing no-partnership clause in opinion affirming summary judg-
ment that dismissed service company's joint-venture theory, but not indicating what weight
court gave this clause); cf. Adobe Res. Corp. v. Newmont Oil Co., 838 S.W.2d 831, 836
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (holding Louisiana courts would not
find partnership among parties to AMI agreement where operative letter held it "shall not
be construed as creating a partnership"); Archer v. Grynberg, 738 F. Supp. 449, 452-53
(N.D. Utah 1990) (discussing no-partnership language in farmout agreement as one ground
to reject partnership among parties to operating agreement), affd, 951 F.2d 1258 (10th Cir.
1991). But see Davidson v. Enstar, 860 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1988) (affirming summary judg-
ment holding defendants immune under LHWCA because of joint venture, in spite of no-
partnership clause, reversing on rehearing its prior decision in 848 F.2d 574, 577-78 (5th Cir.
1988) and affirming trial court by following Bertrand v. Forest Oil Corp., 441 F.2d 809 (5th
Cir. 1971)).
In another oft-cited Texas Supreme Court opinion, Luling Oil & Gas Co. v. Humble Oil
& Ref. Co., 191 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1946), the supreme court affirmed the judgment below
that there was no partnership because "the contract in suit negatives the existence of an
intention to create a partnership relation." Id. at 722. But the next sentence seemed to
explain the holding by noting that the contract did not authorize either side to create bind-
ing third-party liability for the other. Id. So it is not clear whether the contract had an
express disclaimer, or just did not create authority for one partner to bind another and the
court was holding that a party needed express authority to create liability for another.
Ironically (given the initial purpose of Article VII.A.), some courts have gone further
and suggested that the parties may be free to extinguish the operator's liability within their
venture, but not to third parties. See, e.g., Misco-United, 462 F.2d at 80. If that is so, the no-
partnership and several liability clauses may not be effective in their original intent. Natu-
rally, parties cannot extinguish their liabilities to third parties simply because they say so.
Were that the case, partners could evade general common-law duties by contracting them
away. See, e.g., Mud Control Labs. v. Covey, 269 P.2d 854, 859 (Utah 1954) (if parties could
contract away third-party liability, they would "by private agreement between themselves,
obtain the advantages of limited partnership without complying with the statutory require-
ments"). But these courts have not offered a justification for distorting an article aimed at
confirming that the operator cannot expose its partners to direct third-party liability by
using it to reduce the operator's own duty to these interest owners. The result is an oilfield
Catch-22: where the article is intended to prevent liability (external liability), it will not
work, but where it was not intended to limit liability (internal duties), it will do so.
113. Caddo Oil Co. v. O'Brien, 908 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1990).
[Vol. 56
JUDGING MADE TOO EASY
the Owners only in cases of the Operator's willful misconduct."' 114 The
Fifth Circuit cited no authority for this conclusion: no cases, no reference
to prior interpretations of the Article, no discussion of the clause's in-
tent-nothing.
In an equally indiscriminate exculpatory opinion two years later, Stine
v. Marathon Oil Co.,115 the Fifth Circuit interpreted Article V.A. under
Texas law to preclude claims over an alleged failure to drill in a timely
manner, refusal to share information, overcharges, and interference with
a gas purchase agreement. It refused to confine Article V.A.'s exculpa-
tion to "physical acts by the operator within the geographic limits of the
contract area."1 16 Instead, the court extended it to "administrative and
accounting duties"; indeed, to "any acts done under the authority of the
JOA 'as operator." 1 17
Stine had a fairly extended discussion before reaching its draconian
holding. But in general, the discussion considered only whether Article
V.A. should extend to contract as well as tort violations. The court did
not explain why it rejected the nonoperators' position that Article V.A.
covers just operational matters. Though pretending to give Article V.A. a
narrow reading because exculpatory clauses are to be read narrowly, the
court in fact gave the broadest reading possible to the terms "any acts
done under the authority of the JOA 'as Operator.'"118 Citing primarily
two commentators and two very recent opinions, 119 it ignored the large
114. Id. at 17. In Grace-Cajun Oil Co. v. Damson Oil Corp., 897 F.2d 1364, 1366 (5th
Cir. 1990), a trial court had assumed that Article V.A. applies to the operator's filing of a
well status determination application necessary to secure a higher federal regulated gas
price, but it found the operator grossly negligent in not filing the application. Id. The Fifth
Circuit did not decide the scope of the clause because it found that by assuming to sell the
nonoperators' gas in its gas purchase agreement, defendant Damson assumed responsibil-
ity for filing the application. Id. at 1366-67.
115. 976 F.2d 254, 259-61 (5th Cir. 1992).
116. Id. at 259.
117. Id. at 260. Ernest Smith accurately interprets Stine and its aggressive reading to
stand for a "global standard of limited liability binding on [nonoperators] and the operator
in all circumstances." Smith, Voluntary Agreements & Compulsory Orders, supra note 80,
at 3-7. Stine clearly is at the "outer limits" of exculpation. Hendrix & Golding, supra note
80, at 10-30.
The Article V.A. opinions almost always focus on the Article's gross-negligence lan-
guage. Patrick Martin has argued that other language in Article V.A. on the operator's
"full control" should itself negate the third element of joint ventures and mining partner-
ships (the participation or cooperation prong). See Martin, supra note 100, at 109. He cites
Hamilton v. TXO, 648 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which the
court cited the operator's "full control" under the JOA in denying a joint venture, id. at
321, and Humble Oil, where the court did note the lack of authority for either party to
create third-party liability, 191 S.W.2d at 722, though the latter seemed to rely primarily on
the contract's fixing the time for payment in its accounting dispute, id. at 721, as examples
of courts using the operator's high control to negate a joint venture. Yet if the JOA opera-
tor's "full control" always precluded a joint venture or mining partnership, every one of
the bountiful joint-venture and mining-partnership cases that concern anything like the
JOA could have been decided summarily as a matter of law - and the industry would not
need its treasured express disclaimer.
118. Stine, 976 F.2d at 261 (emphasis added).
119. The court cited an article in which Ernest Smith urged applying Article V.A. to
contract duties and Andrew Derman's JOA book (see DERMAN, supra note 6) in which he
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body of cases containing the traditional analysis. Readers would have no
idea that the court was reversing settled JOA interpretations.
A number of other opinions adopted restrictive readings of Article
V.A. in the 1990s. They generally employed brusque, conclusory discus-
sions, mainly citing or referencing the language of the paragraph without
grappling with the purpose of the Article or the conflict with
precedent. 120
A new militancy about limiting business liability has shown up in aca-
demic commentary as well. With increasing frequency, authors have
urged courts to abandon even the possibility of fiduciary responsibility. 1 2
seemed to endorse a broad reading, Caddo, and Grace-Cajun Oil. Stine, 976 F.2d at 260-61.
In an interesting disregard for precedent, the court arbitrarily treated the issue as if its first
judicial consideration occurred in 1990, and the many prior cases could be disregarded.
Offering no explanation for the prior holdings and not even acknowledging their existence,
the court certainly disregarded them.
120. See, e.g., Dime Box Petroleum Corp. v. LL&E, 938 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (10th Cir.
1991) (citing Article V.A. as evidence that "parties contracted for a standard to measure
operator's conduct which is different than that applicable to a fiduciary"); Caddo Oil Co. v.
O'Brien, 908 F.2d 13, 17 (5th Cir. 1990) (glib opinion rejecting fiduciary argument in ac-
counting claim by citing language close to Article V.A.'s (operator liable only "in cases of
the Operator's willful misconduct"), with no elaboration or case discussion); Archer v.
Grynberg, 738 F. Supp. 449, 452-53 (N.D. Utah 1990) (holding in farmout case that Article
V.A. "will normally prevail" over general law of fiduciaries, and rejecting fiduciary duty in
dispute over operator's alleged failure to develop); Bogert, 630 F. Supp. at 966-69 (citing
Article V.A. as well as provisions seemingly governing information and drilling issues, in
holding that parties limited fiduciary duty by contract); see also Huggs, Inc. v. LPC Energy,
Inc., 889 F.2d 649, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1989) (though operator failed to pay delay rentals,
affirming trial court's finding of no liability when exculpatory paragraph provided operator
would not be liable for "mistake or oversight" in failing to pay rentals); Oryx Energy Co.
v. Tatex Energy, 779 F. Supp. 144, 146 (D. Colo. 1991) (enforcing broader limit of operator
liability "to any party for anything done or omitted to be done by it in the conduct of
operations" unless in bad faith, in lawsuit over lease lost when operator plugged well).
In a contrasting case, Grace-Cajun Oil, an interest owner succeeded in holding an opera-
tor liable for its losses from the operator's failure to file an NGPA well determination, in
spite of a clause like Article V.A. (the operator was not liable as operator except for "such
as may result from gross negligence" or breach of the contract provisions), by treating the
operator's entering a gas purchase agreement as separately creating "responsibility for
tasks necessary to its performance of that agreement." Grace-Cajun Oil Co. v. Damson Oil
Corp., 897 F.2d 1364, 1366-67 (5th Cir. 1990). The trial court had found the operator
grossly negligent, id. at 1367, but the appellate court did not reach this issue because its
decision removed the gross-negligence barrier.
121. See, e.g., Hendrix & Golding, supra note 80, § 10.04[2][a], at 10-15 to -18 (arguing
that JOA negates fiduciary relationship because courts either will enforce express dis-
claimer or, if one is absent, many courts will not impose any duties beyond those defined in
contract); Martin, supra note 100 (arguing that courts should treat the JOA as a purely
contractual relationship and enforce disclaimers, and claiming that this is the emerging
standard). The change perhaps can best be seen in articles like Scott Lansdown, The Con-
tractual, Fiduciary, and Ethical Obligations of a Party to a Joint Operating Agreement that
Owns or Operates a Facility that Serves the Joint Operation, 41 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
13-1 (1995), which treats the operating agreement as not establishing a fiduciary tie, as if
everyone knows that the disclaimers will be enforced without any acknowledgement that
this is a sharply disputed position. Id. at 13-9, 13-24 to -29 (fiduciary duty does not exist
because of disclaimers or can be sharply narrowed by agreement); see also 2 KUNTZ, supra
note 49, § 19.6(c) (discussing JOA as an entirely contractual relationship).
For an additional example of the cramped perspective that is gaining currency, see an-
other article by Scott Lansdown, The Dozen Most Significant Cases Concerning Operating
Agreements, 23 TEx. STATE BAR SECTIoN Ri-EPORT, OIL, GAS & MIN. L. 17 (1999). Of
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Some commentators seem to feel that parties can contract away the oper-
ator's tort liability, at least inter se, whenever the operator wants; indeed,
whenever the industry wants to put a disclaimer in the JOA. Two authors
have even begun testing the extremist position that the JOA may not
satisfy any of the three joint-venture or mining-partnership
requirements. 22
11. THESE COURTS HAVE NOT JUSTIFIED THEIR SHIFT IN
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The new cases ignore their abandonment of traditional joint-venture
and mining-partnership cases like Oklahoma Co. and even of the gener-
ally broad, factual analysis of cases like Rankin. The new treatment of the
disclaimers and exclusions is flatly inconsistent with the unit operator,
trustee-of-funds, and marketing-agent cases; it also does not fit with the
room that the 1989 JOA has left for a fiduciary duty in handling funds
and marketing production. Moreover, this late protuberance on the body
of oil and gas law produces many new problems. The language relied on
itself harbors interpretive problems ignored by these courts, and the rigid
protection for operators opens up new inconsistencies in the JOA. Fi-
nally, these courts have forgotten the skeptical eye that courts normally
bring to efforts to disavow tort liability and to anticompetitive efforts by
Lansdown's even-dozen "significant" cases, not one of the key cases identified in this arti-
cle, neither Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977), nor Oklahoma Co. v. O'Neil,
440 P.2d 978 (Okla. 1968), or Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1963), for joint
ventures; Reserve Oil, Inc. v. Dixon, 711 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1983), for the trustee-type
duty; Young v. West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, 275 P.2d 304 (Okla. 1954), appeal dis-
missed, 345 U.S. 909 (1955), for unit operators; or Johnston v. American Cometra, Inc., 837
S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied), for marketing cases, makes an appear-
ance. Instead, fully six of Lansdown's twelve cases are essentially disclaimer or no fiduciary
cases: Hamilton v. TXO, 648 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stan-
dard JOA no fiduciary duty), Bogert (a key case for using the JOA as a shield against
fiduciary responsibility), True Oil v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781 (Wyo. 1989) (using
JOA terms to limit fiduciary obligation), Dime Box (holding that disclaimer had narrowed
modified fiduciary obligation), Exxon v. Crosby-Mississippi Resources, Ltd., 775 F. Supp.
969 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (treating Copas two-year claims limitations period as creating "con-
clusive presumption of correctness" to block claims more than two years old), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 40 F.3d 1474 (5th Cir. 1995), and Stine (giving broadest reading to Article
V.A.'s limit of operator's liability to gross negligence or willful misconduct, holding that it
reaches all acts done under JOA authority). A seventh case, TexStar North America, Inc. v.
Ladd Petroleum Corp., 809 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied),
held that any implied obligation was blocked when the issue was covered by JOA terms; it
too stands for the proposition that the JOA limits extra-contractual duties. The effort to so
heavily tilt the industry's "significant" cases to cases that limit the operator's duty, while
ignoring the many cases that impose duties beyond the contract, is par for the course in the
revisionism of recent years.
122. Patrick Martin has argued that, notwithstanding the many courts finding to the
contrary, the standard arrangement may not satisfy any of the joint-venture elements. See
Martin, supra note 100, at 104-11. Gary Conine has launched a unique reading that what
the courts really have been doing (though they never gave the slightest hint that they un-
derstood this) was to enforce a duty only for "drilling ventures," but not for other joint
operations. See Gary Conine, Joint Ventures in Oil and Gas Contracts, 47 INST. ON OIL &
GAS L. & TAX'N 8-1, 8-20 to -22 (1996).
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an industry's dominant firms to collectively limit their liability to those
doing business with them.
A. THE UNIT, TRUSTEE, AND MARKETING CASES CONTRADICT THE
RECENT PROBUSINESS TREND, As Do ALL JOINT-VENTURE
AND MINING-PARTNERSHIP CASES THAT TREAT
FIDUCIARY STATUS AS A FACT ISSUE
These recent cases are flatly inconsistent with the much longer, earlier
precedent. Many unit agreements have language endowing the operator
with primary control, limiting its liability for activity in the Contract Area
to gross negligence or willful misconduct, and disclaiming partnerships. If
that language had an absolutist effect, Young's unit rule could not survive.
If Article V.A. or VII.A. functioned as cases like Stine suggest, they also
would prevent the operator handling trust funds and the operator mar-
keting nonoperator production from being a fiduciary in those
activities. 123
Cases like Stine would revolutionize oilfield joint-venture and mining-
partnership analysis as well. Were they correct, the dozens of cases scruti-
nizing the record for acts of "control" or "participation" would have been
wasting their time on an irrelevant inquiry because a handful of contract
words determine the outcome anyway. There would be no need to reach
three-part tests; no matter how much participation and control the non-
operators enjoyed in a well, the relationship could not be a fiduciary one.
B. NEITHER ARTICLE VII.A. NOR V.A. SHOULD PRECLUDE
A FIDUCIARY RULE
It is no accident that courts once held that the JOA's standard terms do
not impede treating the operator as a fiduciary. Courts that ignored these
clauses when grappling with the fiduciary question did not do so inadver-
tently. Neither clause should govern the operator's general duty to its
investing partners in traditional JOAs.
I. Article VII.A. Originated to Protect NonOperators from Direct
Liability to Vendors and Others Dealing with the Operator
This Article already has discussed the substantial body of law tracing
Article VII.A.'s no-partnership language back to the problem of limiting
the nonoperator's duty to third parties. The intent of Article VII.A. was to
prevent supply companies or others outside the joint venture from using
the theory that investors have a partner's unlimited liability to gain direct
and unlimited recovery against them. Courts explained that Article
123. Two recent authors have noted, with at least implicit criticism, that cases like
Young, Reserve Oil, and Hawkins "appear[ I to disregard the specific language of various
versions of the Model Form Operating Agreement and focus[ I on the substance of the
relationship between the parties, finding a trustee-type or fiduciary relationship." Reeves
& Thompson, supra note 5, at 220. In claiming that courts "disregard the specific lan-
guage," they ignore the purpose of the language, which the courts honored.
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VII.A.'s purpose was not to limit the operator's obligation to its nonoper-
ating investors.
For instance, even the Fifth Circuit, home of Caddo and Stine, has writ-
ten that the several-liability and no-partnership language "itself belies"
the no-fiduciary argument: "The full text of this paragraph addresses the
relationship of Apache and the owners only insofar as it concerns poten-
tial liabilities or obligations to third parties."'24 In Johnston, the market-
ing-agent case, the Texas court of appeals agreed that no-partnership
clauses apply to third parties and "are not dispositive of the duty issues
raised" between operator and nonoperator. 25 More recently, the Kansas
Supreme Court treated the JOA's no-partnership language as of no ef-
fect, with even broader reasoning as it required an operator to share
property acquired in the unit area with nonoperators. In Amoco v.
Charles B. Wilson, Jr., Inc., the court held:
Section 22, LIABILITY OF PARTIES, does say the parties do not
intend to create a mining partnership or render them liable as part-
ners. It does not say they are not joint venturers in the development
of oil and gas interests in a designated area of designated property. It
does not remove the duty of both the operator and non-operator to
deal with each other in a fair and equitable manner. 26
In the mainstream period, commentators agreed that Article VII.A.
was designed to limit liability to third parties. Howard Williams, for in-
stance, wrote years ago that the Article's goal "is to avoid liability by one
124. See Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1024 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added)
(citing Johnston, 837 S.W.2d at 715-16). The Norman court went on to hold, however, that
neither would the "mere existence" of a JOA prove a joint venture, citing Rankin of all
cases, but not addressing in detail the issue because the nonoperators had not claimed a
joint venture. Id. at 1024. They instead tried to argue, without success, that they could
prove an "informal" fiduciary relationship, which, under Texas law, sometimes arises from
long-standing relationships of trust and confidence. Id. at 1025-26.
125. Johnston, 837 S.W.2d at 715; see supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text; see also
Lavy v. Pitts, 29 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied) (citing Johnston's
interpretation that AAPL intended to shield nonoperators from third parties). In Reserve
Oil, in which the court enforced a trustee-type fiduciary duty, the Tenth Circuit cited Arti-
cle VII.A., but claimed that what it disavowed is "a general agency relationship as to third
parties." Id. at 953 (emphasis added).
The mere fact of having precedent to cite does not, of course, prove that a court is right
or wrong, though it is powerful evidence in a system built upon precedent. It might be
possible that a judge carelessly announced a doctrine; others cited it because it is already
on the books; and no court ever looked at the merits. Parties might even try to raise policy
objections one way or the other, but if the initial pronouncement was clear, courts might
forever more hide behind the shield of precedent. The assumption of precedential reason-
ing is that the early opinions while a doctrine is being hammered out are reasoned opinions
that do grapple with opposing substantive arguments, and that courts will revise or even
overrule doctrines if those reasons are invalidated by changes in social facts, theoretical
understandings, or any other permissible factors. The many fiduciary findings reached in
earlier years without mentioning Article VII.A. or V.A. as a barrier is a strong piece of
evidence that courts understood that those Articles do not apply in the broad manner with
which some courts recently have extended it.
126. Amoco v. Charles B. Wilson, Jr., Inc., 976 P.2d 941, 954 (Kan. 1999). For a critical,
industry-oriented review of Wilson, see Richard James, Kansas Oil and Gas Law: Defining




participant for the torts or contracts of other participants."'' 27
Finally, the more expansive interpretation of Article VII.A. disregards
the hornbook law, set out in many cases and authorities, that a mining
partnership is an intention-defeating doctrine. Mining partnerships are
supposed to impose fiduciary duties regardless of the parties' intentions,
if their arrangement otherwise satisfies the requisites of mining-partner-
ship law. It is old precedent that the mining-partnership doctrine is "in-
tention-defeating"'' 2 8 and that, on its face, a partnership disclaimer, while
"of value as indicating intention, is not legally controlling.' ' 129
127. Williams, supra note 63, at 272. Williams admitted that the language "might be
viewed as negating a fiduciary relation between or among the parties," id. (emphasis ad-
ded), but in general, he predicted that courts increasingly would impose fiduciary duties
where one owner had power "in respect to" another's property, cf. id. at 273. Though the
current Williams and Meyers treatise notes that Article VII.A.'s goal is to avoid third-party
liability, it observes that the standard disclaimer is "of doubtful utility" to investors be-
cause it probably will not bind other persons with tort or contract claims-i.e., traditional
third-party claims-but it "may deprive the investor of rights against the operator" on a
fiduciary claim. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 49, § 435.2, at 514.
There are other authorities that address this issue. See Boigon, Hostile Environment,
supra note 102, at 5-10 to -11 (prior version of Article VII.A. would not bar third-party
claims, and inconclusive inter se because it "says nothing" about joint venture or agency
and does not specifically deny fiduciary rights and responsibilities); Hendrix & Golding,
supra note 80, at 10-12 ("likely that its original purpose was not to negate a fiduciary rela-
tionship, but rather to permit the parties to escape joint liability"); Lane & Boggs, supra
note 102, at 230 (no-partnership language was developed to limit liability to creditors and
third persons, but ironically "it appears to be uniformly recognized that the clause will be
essentially ineffective to that end"); id. at 236 ("[D]oubtful that ... clauses were intended
to control issues of the liability of the parties as between themselves. Rather, they are
'boiler plate,' developed and used to avoid liability to third parties."); Smith, Duties and
Obligations, supra note 80, at 12-7 (discussing delegation of power to operator and Article
VII.A. as intending to shield nonoperators from liability); Watts, supra note 16, at 2798
(stating "reason for a disclaimer is quite clear" and then discussing third-party liability).
In a quite nuanced treatment, Christopher Lane and Catherine Boggs argued that par-
ties might be able to limit fiduciary liability among themselves, "but not to waive that
liability in toto." Lane & Boggs, supra note 102, at 228. They urged parties to specifically
authorize actions that might otherwise violate a fiduciary duty, as well as to try to define a
less-than-fiduciary standard. Id. at 236.
Defeating third-party liability also seems to be the point of such statutes as the old Texas
Article 6132(b), which stated that a JOA "does not of itself establish a partnership." In
Rankin, the Texas Supreme Court held that this Texas statute providing that mere "opera-
tion" of a property under a JOA "does not of itself establish a partnership" precludes a
general partnership relationship, but never suggested that the statute could undermine the
jury's finding of a joint venture within the geographic area of the joint project. Compare
557 S.W.2d at 945-46 (the supreme court's discussion of this statute), with 542 S.W.2d at
895 (the jury's finding). As Rankin shows, this language may disclaim a general partner-
ship duty but not the limited obligations of a mining partner or joint venturer. The similar
language in the Louisiana Code is a little stronger: "[a] written contract for the joint explo-
ration, development, or operation of mineral rights does not create a partnership unless
the contract so expressly provides." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:215 (West 2000).
128. Lee Jones, Mining Partnerships in Texas, 12 TEX. L. REV. 410, 410, 414 (1934).
129. Lee Jones, Problems Presented by Joint Ownership of Oil, Gas and Other Minerals,
32 TEX. L. REV. 697, 717 (1954) (disclaimer of partnership, while "of value as indicating
intention, is not legally controlling," and will not avoid partnership duties when they have
been assumed); Clarence Brimmer, Mining Partnerships, 15 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 85,
92 (1969) (disclaimer of partnership not effective to prevent mining partnership if its ele-
ments otherwise met by acts and conduct). See generally 2 KUNTZ, supra note 49,
§ 19A.7(b), at 112 (mining-partnership duty imposed by law and does not require specific
intent to form arrangement); 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 49, § 435. 1, at 248.1 (min-
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2. Article V.A. Uses Terms that Apply to Physical Operations on the
Wellsite
The language of Article V.A. suggests that courts had good reason for
not letting that Article diminish the operator's overall duty of care to its
investors. Article V.A. gives the operator "full control of all operations,"
makes it perform its duties in a "good and workmanlike manner," and
bars liability to "the other parties for losses sustained or liabilities in-
curred" unless damage results from the operator's "gross negligence or
willful misconduct." 30
This language is well-suited to making the operator act with reasonable
prudence but not as a guarantor in operational matters (e.g., drilling
wells, fishing pipe from the hole, etc.). At least in such activity, it does
suggest that "all parties seem to have assumed the risk of loss arising
from bad judgment or honest error by the operator."' 3' Article V.A. does
not sound designed to go further, however, and regulate the overall op-
erator/nonoperator relationship. "Losses sustained" or "liabilities in-
curred" is not language one would choose to reduce the operator's duty.
The term "losses sustained" sounds like damages to the joint property-a
drilling accident, for instance; the term "liabilities incurred" sounds like
contract obligations the operator incurred for the joint account. In 1989,
in a change that underscores this meaning of Article V.A., the AAPL
inserted an independent contractor clause, which holds that the operator
shall not hold itself out as the nonoperators' agent when dealing with
third parties. 132 Some commentators, too, have noted the seeming fit be-
ing partnership arises by operation of law and denial of partnership "will not prevent the
finding of a mining partnership if all the elements thereof are present").
130. 1989 JOA, supra note 2, Article V.A. (emphasis added). Somewhat amusingly,
two experienced industry hands have claimed that the gross negligence and willful miscon-
duct limitations make legal action rare because "the terms are undefinable and virtually
impossible to prove in a court of law." JOHN JOLLY & JIM BUCK, JOINT INTEREST Ac-
COUNTING: PETROLEUM INDUSTRY PRACTICE 49 (1988). This is an exaggeration, but one
probably close to the effect intended by Article V.A.'s more convinced proponents.
In whatever area that it applies, the standard may exculpate the operator unless it fails to
"use even slight care." See Boigon, Hostile Environment, supra note 102, at 5-26. Hendrix
and Golding find a "dearth of case law" interpreting what the exculpatory provisions really
mean, but they believe gross negligence can be summed up as requiring "extreme careless-
ness or recklessness or a conscious disregard for the rights of others." Hendrix & Golding,
supra note 80, at 10-34 to -35. Splitting the legal hairs, they find "willful misconduct" a
more stringent standard. Id. at 10-36. It will be a rare jury that doesn't treat both of these
as very deferential toward the operator.
131. See Boigon, Hostile Environment, supra note 102, at 5-15. An example of this core
use of Article V.A. in matters of physical operations is Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v.
Mr. Charlie, 294 F. Supp. 1025, 1031 (E.D. La. 1968), affd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 424 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970), a Louisiana case
that applied the operator's limited negligence liability to split the damages to an underwa-
ter pipeline among the owners in their proportionate shares. The court reached this conclu-
sion in spite of finding the operator clearly negligent in siting the offshore drilling platform;
the parties nonetheless had agreed to share all liabilities to third parties.
132. See 1989 JOA, supra note 2, Article V.A. ("Operator shall not be deemed, or hold
itself out as, the agent of the Non-Operators with authority to bind them to any obligation
or liability assumed or incurred by Operator as to any third party."). Patrick Martin op-
poses the limited reading of Article V.A. He urges that its independent contractor lan-
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tween Article V.A. and the requisites of physical operations on the joint
account site. ' 33
Limiting the operator's liability for drilling operations may be palatable
because most operators have the same strong incentive as the nonoper-
ators to do well in physical operations. 134 Operators also benefit from
safe, efficient, trouble-free physical operations. But in internal matters,
like the handling of funds, sale of production, use of affiliates, and acqui-
sition of surrounding properties, the operator can profit by cheating its
investors, so the rationale for deference does not exist.
The business-protecting readings of Article V.A. introduce anomalies
into the overall relationship of the parties interested in the well. If the
Article does apply to everything the operator does, then operators have
no more obligation to their investors than drilling contractors and service
companies have to the joint account. 135 The investment relation might as
well be a venture among strangers. Indeed, the operator's obligation will
be less unless the supply contract duplicates the gross-negligence, willful-
misconduct limitation. It is implausible that the operator is no closer to its
investors than a drilling company is to the joint venture, and perhaps
even more distant.
guage "mak[es] clear that the disclaimer of partnership is not limited to the operator's
relations with third parties." Martin, supra note 100, at 1l1. But this language seems much
more concerned with damage that diminishes the joint account, instead of with the direct
operator-nonoperator relationship and the operator's own malfeasance. Martin says he
"feel[s] certain" that the joint-venture test "should mean that each of the partners or ven-
turers is able to act on behalf of the common endeavor," id. at 107, a hurdle that neither
the actual-participation nor legal-right-to-control courts have applied, but one that seems
designed to disqualify the standard operating arrangement with its centralization of active
power in the operator as a matter of law in every case, regardless of acts of joint participa-
tion or control.
133. See Lane & Boggs, supra note 102, at 223-25 (gross negligence limit should be
honored in "operational matters," but only when neither side is enriched at other's ex-
pense); Smith, Voluntary Agreements & Compulsory Orders, supra note 80, at 3-10 (lan-
guage of Article V.A., with limits to "Contract Area" and its "good and workmanlike"
standard, "seems more appropriate to physical activity than to billings, purchasing and
administrative decision making"; usual reason for exculpatory clause is to avoid liability for
catastrophic damage, not breaches of contract).
134. Some operators do not share this incentive fully. If an operator decides to build its
company around high-volume operations, on the theory that the law of averages will pro-
duce handsome returns for it as long as its investors pick up most of the cost of the wells, it
may outstrip its ability to monitor but fare well if it has even a few barnburner wells. The
great majority of investors in these poorly managed wells will lose money. Put another
way, even a reckless operator who can raise funds to drill dozens of wells a year largely at
the expense of others is likely to get rich if even a few wells really come in. The author has
discussed operators like these in John Burritt McArthur, Coming of Age: Initiating the
Oilfield into Performance Disclosure, 50 SMU L. REv. 663 (1997).
135. A drilling contract routinely requires performance in a "good and workmanlike
manner." 2 KUN'TZ, supra note 49, at § 19A.5, at 98-100. This linguistic parallelism is an-
other sign that Article V.A. was aimed only at physical operations on the well. Perhaps
even more striking as a contrast to the operator cases is that even in these distant relations,
courts do not lightly enforce general exculpatory clauses. Id. at 104 (courts will look at
definiteness of language, position of parties, and compensation before deciding whether to
enforce; parties with superior bargaining power generally cannot gain exculpation from
their own negligence).
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Not only that, but reading Article V.A. to reduce the operator's overall
responsibility conflicts with other plain words in Article V.A. and other
articles. Article V requires management in a "good and workmanlike"
manner-the reasonable prudence standard-and, since 1989, all parties
are supposed to act "in good faith in their dealings with each other with
respect to activities hereunder."' 36 A careless operator is not prudent,
even if its actions are not grossly negligent or willful misconduct. But if
the operator is never liable for less than extreme conduct, then, presuma-
bly, it can fall well below the workmanlike standard as long as it does not
hurt its investors intentionally or with gross recklessness and still not be
liable even for a run-of-the-mill breach of contract. 37 Aggressive read-
ings of Article V.A. would strip the operator of the duty that for decades
has defined its basic obligation.
The new definition also inserts an odd duality into the common ven-
ture. The operator has to act with reasonable prudence toward all its roy-
alty owners, 138 but is free to act negligently as far as its working-interest
owners are concerned.139 Even though the operator can commit nonoper-
ators to far greater financial exposure than royalty owners, nonetheless it
would owe them less fidelity. No commentator or court has yet suggested
why working-interest owners should be relegated to second-class citizen-
ship when they have such vital interests at stake.' 40
136. The drafters of the 1989 JOA lodged this language in Article VIIA. 1989 JOA,
supra note 2, Article VII.A.
137. Ernest Smith has suggested that Article V.A. should encompass and shield viola-
tions that would amount to a breach of contract. He bases his argument on the fact that the
1956 JOA made operators liable for breach of contract as well as for gross negligence, but
this preservation of express contract liability was replaced by the willful misconduct termi-
nology. See Smith, Duties and Obligations, supra note 80, at 12-30 to -31. The Fifth Circuit
cited Smith with approval in Stine, 976 F.2d at 260. Yet is it plausible that parties entering a
JOA imagine that the operator can escape scot-free if it carelessly breaches the JOA, as
long as it is not willful or reckless about it?
138. See generally 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 49, § 806.
139. Hendrix and Golding have predicted that courts will treat the conflict between the
reasonable prudent operator standard and the disclaimer by lowering the operator's stan-
dard of care. See Hendrix & Golding, supra note 80, at 10-33 to -34. It is one sign of the
wild rush to protect operators that courts and commentators might suggest jettisoning a
standard that has embodied the operator's basic obligation for so long, and that remains its
duty to royalty owners under the general implied covenant standard.
140. Some might argue that the lesser sophistication of royalty owners justifies their
getting more protection. And it certainly should be undisputed that royalty owners are on
average less wise in the ways of the business than the average working interest owner. See
Ernest Smith, Joint Operating Agreement Jurisprudence, 33 WASHB3URN L.J. 834, 839 (1994)
(lessee is "almost invariably in a superior bargaining position"); id. 851 (implying lessors
will not have experience); Gary Conine, Speculation, Prudent Operation, and the Econom-
ics of Oil and Gas Law, 33 WASI-13URN L.J. 670, 674 (1994) (few owners of mineral rights
"have the technical or financial capability of conducting, or are willing to assume the risk
of, such operations"); John Lowe, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law, 27
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 1-1, 1-19 (1988) ("[T]he lease transaction occurs because
the owner of the mineral rights generally lacks the expertise and capital to develop them,
and so transfers them to an oil company, which impliedly or expressly represents that it
possesses the talent and the money to develop them."); cf. Jacqueline Weaver, Implied
Covenants In Oil and Gas Law Under Federal Energy Price Regulation, 34 VAND. L. REV.
1473, 1487 (1981) (summarizing Professor Merrill's work on implied covenants as follows:
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C. THE RECENT TREND IGNORES BARRIERS THE LAW ORDINARILY
ERECTS TO TORT DISCLAIMERS AND JOINT
ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR BY COMPETITORS
Issues surrounding disclaimers of tort liability and antitrust concerns
have become more central to the operator-duty issue today because, in
1989, the AAPL adopted a new JOA that clearly intends to extinguish the
operator's internal fiduciary duty in most areas and not just deal with
third-party issues. The new Article VII.A. includes the condition that: "In
their relations with each other under this agreement, the parties shall not
be considered fiduciaries or to have established a confidential relation-
ship but rather shall be free to act on an arm's-length basis in accordance
with their own respective self-interest .... ,"141 The large oil companies
whose representatives sat on the drafting committee clearly intend to
avoid internal fiduciary responsibility.142
One telling aspect of the restrictive JOA cases is their resolute discus-
sion of the fiduciary duty as an issue sui generis, without any acknowl-
edgement that the law casts a skeptical eye on the disclaimer of tort
duties and has standards governing such efforts. In fact, the law generally
disfavors blanket abandonment of tortious responsibility. In Texas, for
instance, disclaimers of negligence generally have to be conspicuous and
carefully spell out the behavior covered. One recent treatment of Texas
standards concludes that for Article V.A., it is "unlikely that the JOA
Exculpatory Language would be effective" to disclaim liability for negli-
gence, because it is not conspicuous and does not specifically identify the
immunized acts. 143 Another review that covers all major oilfield jurisdic-
tions concludes that exculpatory clauses, at least under certain conditions
including that the exculpation be clearly expressed, are likely to be en-
"the lessee/lessor relationship is by its very nature tainted with unequal bargaining
power").
The critical factor here, however, is not subjective ability, but the dependence fostered
by the operator's dominant role in the venture. While working interest owners have some
voting rights not shared by royalty owners, and get some information under standard in-
vestment practices that royalty owners do not get, they too rely on the operator to make
the major decisions that will determine how the venture fares. Moreover, their financial
exposure, which is not limited to an acreage contribution, is far greater than the average
royalty owner's, so in some ways they have far more at stake.
The use of Article V.A. to define the operator's tort duty internally can create a subtle,
implicit conflict across the JOA as well. The reading assumes that even though the parties
dealt expressly with the scope of tort liability in Article VII.A. (regardless of whether the
proper reading of that article is as an attempt to emasculate ordinary tort law only for third
party cases, or internally as well), they already had treated the same question in Article
V.A.
141. 1989 JOA, supra note 2, Article VII.A. (emphasis added).
142. The JOA has been an offspring of the largest oilfield companies from its inception.
The initial 1956 form was written by representatives of all but one of 28 invited "larger oil
companies." Young, supra note 6, at 199. Significantly, the one unnamed company refused
to participate because "of a belief that such a joint effort might have adverse antitrust
implications." 1I.
143. Dick Watt et al., A Litigation Perspective: Selected Thoughts on the Express Negli-
gence Doctrine, Exculpatory Clauses, and Indemnity in Joint Operating Agreements, 26 OIL
GAS & ENM-cRY RES. L. 14, 23 (State Bar of Texas 2001).
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forced in four states that lack anti-indemnity statutes (Colorado, Mon-
tana, Oklahoma, and Utah) and two states that exclude operating
agreements from such statutes (Texas and Louisiana), but that New Mex-
ico and Wyoming, two other major oilfield jurisdictions, would not en-
force them.1 44
This Article does not address this intricate statutory area. It is worth
noting, however, that none of the trend-setting disclaimer cases even
mentions the policy issues that surround efforts to disclaim or severely
limit tort liability. This omission is a sign of their unseemly haste to limit
the operator's responsibility.
The other barrier ignored by the new cases is the antitrust ban on an-
ticompetitive restrictions among competitors, including competitors act-
ing via joint ventures and trade associations. Antitrust litigation has been
conspicuously absent from the exploration and production sector of the
industry. There are famous antitrust cases at other levels of the industry,
like the case dissolving Standard Oil Company in 1911 and the bench-
mark merger case involving El Paso Natural Gas Company and North-
west Natural Pipeline Company. 145 By and large, however, the activities
of finding and producing oil and gas are notable for the small amount of
antitrust litigation.146 Some of this exemption is due to the fact that natu-
144. Robert C. Bledsoe, The Operating Agreement. Matters Not Covered or Inade-
quately Covered, 47 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 15-1, 15-4 to -18 (2001).
145. These two landmark cases are Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
146. One sign of the absence of antitrust litigation is the lack of significant law-review
writing on oil and gas antitrust issues. In one of the rare treatments of these issues, the
main focus was large pipeline and manufacturing joint ventures and joint bidding issues.
Arthur Thad Smith, Antitrust Aspects of Joint Operations, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
311 (1971). This author treated joint operating agreements briefly, but seemingly only from
the standpoint of whether the agreement reduced competition among the parties-not the
problem of the industry agreeing on a standard form for all its operations. Smith dismissed
JOA issues as not raising serious antitrust problems. He discounted the risk of exposure
here because he felt that amendments to insert a take-in-kind right removed the basis for
finding joint marketing or pooling of profits. Id. at 339-40. Smith claimed in addition that
such joint ventures were "absolutely necessary in the interests of conservation," thus dis-
cerning a procompetitive justification. Id. at 340-41. His conclusion: "Where a joint venture
enables parties to accomplish something together which no one party could achieve sepa-
rately, the risk of antitrust exposure should be at a minimum." Id. at 344.
Another survey almost a decade later noted the surprisingly small amount of litigation
over exploration and production. It too focused heavily on joint ventures and joint bidding.
William Burke & Rufus Oliver, Current Antitrust Developments in Oil and Gas Explora-
tion and Production, 30 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 271, 272-73 (1979). They attrib-
uted the lack of antitrust litigation to the large number of participants in E&P (making
antitrust abuse less likely to be profitable, to the extent that a larger number of firms
makes the industry competitive), and the fairly heavy regulation and preemption under
state law. Id. When these authors discussed their antitrust concerns about joint operating
agreements, they too focused on the removal of competition within a single joint venture.
Id. at 292 ("By suspending operation of the rule of capture, joint operating agreements
eliminate the competition that would otherwise occur among participating tract owners
.... "). The authors predicted that the JOA's effect on price was too indirect to fall under
the per-se rule against price fixing. Id. at 293-94. The article did cite a Justice Department
lawsuit in 1947 that challenged unit operation of certain pools. See id. at 293 (citation omit-
ted). That case was dismissed, apparently after the government failed to pursue discovery.
Id. at 293 n.51. See generally 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 49, § 911. For a history of
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ral gas prices were regulated from 1954 until their phased-in deregulation
under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. Regulated rates and activity
generally are sheltered from direct antitrust challenge. 147 Another reason
is that the large number of independent oil companies reduces concentra-
tion in many relevant markets. Nonetheless, joint acts by oil companies to
reduce their legal exposure raise serious antitrust concerns.
The rules governing joint conduct-when competitors act together-
derive from section one of the Sherman Act and analogous state provi-
sions. The JOA is an example of joint conduct because it was drafted by
representatives of some of the largest oil companies, all direct competi-
tors of each other. Section one prohibits agreements in restraint of
trade. 48 Some categories of agreement, like those that (1) fix, maintain,
or stabilize prices; (2) divide markets; or (3) boycott competitors, are
"per se" illegal. If the plaintiff has enough evidence to prove any of these
agreements, it is entitled to present its damage claim to the jury. For in-
stance, if a group of producers sat down and agreed (orally or in writing)
on the price they would charge investors for serving as operator, or at
least a price floor below which they would not fall, their agreement would
be per se illegal.' 49 It would be no defense that the price was written into
unitization beginning with oilman Henry Doherty's 1924 proposal and the resulting anti-
trust issues, see ROBERT HARDWICKE, ANTITRusT LAWS Er AL. V. UNIT OPERATION OF
OIL OR GAS POOLS (rev. ed. 1961). Burke and Oliver predicted that any JOA anticompeti-
tive impact upon prices would be slight, while the agreements often promote competition
by bringing new production to market, and so should survive rule-of-reason tests. Burke &
Oliver, supra, at 295. The authors claimed that state regulation should at least help tip the
balance toward legality, id. at 296, and that provisions to take-in-kind should help skirt
antitrust liability. The article ended with a discussion of monopoly issues within given
fields. Id. at 299-310.
In a sign of how far detailed antitrust considerations are from the consciousness of even
very good oil and gas lawyers, neither article discussed the problem of having an industry's
largest players combine to fix terms that limit liability and otherwise disadvantage custom-
ers (here, the nonoperating investors).
147. Regulation can preclude antitrust challenges in several ways. Courts can find anti-
trust claims preempted when faced with a detailed regulatory scheme over the same sub-
ject matter. The "state-action" doctrine protects behavior that follows "clearly articulated"
and actively supervised state policies. See, e.g., Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579
(1976). Or, were a plaintiff to challenge particular prices that had been set in ratemaking
proceedings, it could find its case dismissed under the filed-rate doctrine. The lead filed-
rate case is Keogh v. Chicago & Northwest Railway, 260 U.S. 156 (1922), a railroad case.
For an example of the filed rate doctrine in the oilfield context, see Arkla v. Hall, 453 U.S.
571 (1981), which rejected producer's attempt to claim higher price that exceeded filed
rate. And courts may defer to the "primary jurisdiction" of a regulatory agency if needed
to preserve a complex regulatory scheme. See I1 SECION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIAION, ANIITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 11128-31 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter
ANTITRUSTI LAW DEVELOI'MENTS].
148. In its familiarly broad language, section one prohibits "[e]very contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1997).
149. Price fixing is illegal even if it is accomplished indirectly. In a case involving the oil
and gas industry, if not the E&P level, major oil companies agreed among themselves to
buy surplus gasoline from competing independent refiners in order to prevent price "de-
pressions." The Supreme Court agreed that this price manipulation accomplished indi-
rectly by manipulating supplies nonetheless is per se illegal. United States v. Socony-
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a standard-form contract that also had efficiency justifications. If parties
to the JOA divided markets between them, it would be just as unlaw-
ful. 150 And a group of competitors cannot refuse to deal with another
except on certain terms or refuse to deal with certain companies. 15'
The first hurdle faced by an antitrust claim over the JOA is proving
agreement. For the large oil companies directly involved in drafting the
JOA, there may be evidence that they agreed with competitors to use its
terms. But many of today's operators did not participate in drafting the
JOA, and there can be sharp disagreements on what they "agree" to do
when they use the JOA. In the absence of direct agreement, such a case
would have to be proven by circumstantial evidence, which under today's
standards generally requires evidence that "tends to exclude the possibil-
ity of independent action."' 52 Each defendant, of course, will claim that it
is purely in its self-interest to use the JOA. Moreover, though it is hard to
see what the drafters of the JOA thought they were doing if not agreeing
on settled industry standards, including reducing a risk all operators
share, it is only fair to point out that there is no public evidentiary record
even on that. 53 Showing agreement is the first evidentiary hurdle for a
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). That the Court issued this ruling when the country
still had not fully emerged from the Depression, and in the aftermath of industry provi-
sions under the National Industrial Recovery Act in the early New Deal that rested on the
desirability of joint industry cooperation to stabilize markets, shows the Court's strong
commitment to the rule against price fixing. For other lead cases, see United States v. Ad-
dyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899) and United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392 (1927). Later courts have nibbled at the edges of the per se rule by identifying
special areas where agreements with an effect on price may get rule-of-reason treatment.
See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (treating limit on number of tele-
vised football games as horizontal price fixing but nonetheless applying rule of reason);
Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (analyzing blanket licensing for users of copy-
right music under rule of reason). Regardless, there is no serious doubt of the general
rule's continuing vitality.
150. See generally Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
151. See generally Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Sugges-
tions that the Court might have backed away from this per-se rule were quashed on the
unusual facts in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990), in which
the Court accepted a per-se ban against lawyers representing indigents who tried to in-
crease their fee by refusing new appointments until they were better paid.
152. This language, drawn from the vertical price-fixing case of Monsanto Co. v. Spray-
Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984), received a boost when the Supreme Court
used it as a broader standard in the predatory-price conspiracy case of Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986), and has spawned a cottage industry of find-
ing "plus factors" sufficient to allow a jury to decide that defendants' behavior was joint
and not independent. For a survey of this law, see I ANTITRUS-T LAW DEVELOPMENTS,
supra note 147, at 8-14.
153. The prediscovery evidence of agreement is not as strong as, say, in Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993), the trade-industry case in which insurers
fought to impose terms through standard form contracts. Certain insurers, their trade
group, and foreign re-insurers brought direct pressure to change the terms in standardized
commercial general liability policies by refusing to deal with companies using older forms.
The main changes sought were to alter commercial general liability (CGL) insurance
polices in an existing 1984 standard form promulgated by the Insurance Services Office,
Inc. (ISO), a trade association providing "support services" for the CGL industry. The
changes would (1) eliminate "occurrence" insurance (for undiscovered conditions that oc-




The second major issue facing an antitrust claim is whether an agree-
ment, even if proven, violates the antitrust laws. The JOA is not as naked
a restraint of trade as direct price-fixing or market allocation and, for that
reason, is most likely to be tested under the rule of reason. Joint action by
competitors that has multiple purposes, including the pursuit of increased
efficiencies, and that does not facially fix prices, divide markets, or boy-
cott companies, generally is judged under this standard. 5 4 For instance,
when firms enter joint ventures, courts generally use the rule of reason.' 55
In such cases, the jury weighs the pro- and anticompetitive effects of the
challenged behavior in a relevant geographic and product market. 56
The oil and gas industry is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny just be-
cause it acts through trade groups or industry associations. Other diverse
trade groups have been exposed to potential antitrust liability even
though they acted through trade associations, for instance: (1) garment
manufacturers that attempted to boycott retailers who copied their "orig-
inal creation" clothing and sold lower-priced versions; (2) the American
Medical Association in its efforts to prevent physicians from working at a
nonprofit health provider run for government employees; (3) a county
bar association trying to set minimum fees for its members; and (4) insur-
ers who imposed restrictive terms via form contracts developed by an
industry trade group. 157 Antitrust scrutiny will attach even if the stan-
dards have a strong, legitimate purpose that is unrelated to anticompeti-
made" policies could be filed, thus excluding the risk of undiscovered claims from before a
policy's date; (3) eliminate certain pollution coverage; and (4) cap legal defense costs as
part of the total policy coverage. Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 772-73. The largest Ameri-
can re-insurer enlisted its trade group to agree to use forms with the last three changes, and
it and another major insurance company hired a reinsurance broker to announce at an ISO
meeting that reinsurers would not reinsure using the 1984 ISO form. Id. at 774-75. Defend-
ants took steps to pressure London reinsurers to reject the 1984 ISO CGL forms as well.
Id. This activity bears similarity to the drafting process for the JOA in that here too major
industry companies agreed on a standard form to be used by the entire industry; it differs
(at least on the known evidence) in the absence of direct efforts to boycott those who do
not use the form.
154. The Supreme Court adopted the rule-of-reason test in an effort to find some bal-
ance for section one's nominal prohibition on every "contract, combination .... or conspir-
acy in restraint of trade" in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
156. The test involves a broad and very factual analysis. See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be obtained, are all relevant facts.
157. For the cases, see Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); United
States v. American Medical Ass'n, 317 U.S. 519 (1942); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975); and Hartford Fire Ins.
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tive goals. 158
The JOA is likely to receive rule-of-reason treatment. There is little
doubt that having standard JOAs is efficient. This standard-form contract
saves transactions costs by avoiding individual negotiation for every ven-
ture and has produced settled interpretations and expectations of the
core investment form. Yet there is no showing that reading Article V.A.
and VII.A. to extinguish the operator's fiduciary duty is necessary to
achieve these efficiencies. The purpose and effect of these Articles, as
most recently interpreted, is to limit the operators' exposure and thus
improve their economic position across a wide swath of industry invest-
ments, all at the expense of the nonoperators doing business with them.
This joint, industry-wide effort to exclude liability that otherwise could
arise under state law is suspect under the rule of reason. 159 The oil and
gas industry thrived in decades of vigorous exploration without giving op-
erators an absolute shield against fiduciary liability. It is hardly plausible
that the recently expanded protection is needed to bring the JOA into
existence or to secure its benefits.
Oil companies, like any businesses seeing a chance to minimize their
exposure, will claim that they never would engage in joint investments
unless protected from fiduciary liability. They will speak darkly of run-
away juries, as befits American businesses' basic distrust of a jury-based
system of justice.' 60 But these are cries immemorial of business seeking to
avoid regulation. The same claims that regulation would destroy initiative
appeared almost a century ago against workers compensation, in the
1930s against the Social Security Act and virtually every form of New
Deal regulation, and crop up today against reform of accounting stan-
158. For an example of the irrelevance of the purity of motive for an anticompetitive
agreement, see the Ivy League's agreement on uniform financial-aid standards, an agree-
ment tested under the rule of reason. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir.
1993). In order to limit competition based on aid packages, Ivy League schools had agreed
to offer only need-based (not merit-based) financial aid; adopted a common formula to
determine need; and affected schools met to agree on the "family contribution" for stu-
dents they had each admitted. Id. at 662. The schools "understood that failing to comply
with the Overlap Agreement would result in retaliatory sanctions," as indeed happened
when Princeton began awarding small merit scholarships in 1986. Id. at 663.
Other industry-level activities have been struck down as violating section one, some-
times under a per se rule and sometimes using the rule-of-reason. See FTC v. Trial Law-
yers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 435-36; FTC v. Ind. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986)
(dentists' agreement to withhold X-rays from insurers, who would use them to evaluate
claims, violated section one but not under per-se rule); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med.
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 349 (1982) (agreement among physicians on maximum rates charged to
specific health insurers illegal under per se rule); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 683-84, 693-96 (1978) (agreement by group of engineers to refuse to
negotiate client fees until the client selected an engineer invalidated under abbreviated
rule of reason); Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788 (1975) (county bar association's minimum fee
schedule violated section one, although with suggestion that rules adopted by professions
receive lighter scrutiny).
159. The same issues arise with the Copas claims limitations, discussed supra note 9.
160. For the suggestion that at least one supreme court, the business-oriented Texas
Supreme Court, shares the distrust of juries and will strain to decide fact issues as a matter
of law when doing so might protect business interests, see Phil Hardberger, Juries Under
Siege, 30 ST'. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1998).
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dards. That such objections are knee-jerk business objections does not
prove that they are incorrect (or correct), but, as with all ideological
myths, it does suggest that courts and legislators should approach them
with skepticism.
The robust health of the industry under old JOA interpretations shows
that the efficiency justifications for the new restrictive JOA readings are
wildly exaggerated. There is little reason to vary from the rule that a
generation ago Howard Williams correctly, albeit overoptimistically, pre-
dicted would come to regulate this industry:
Whenever the owner of an interest in oil and gas has a power with
respect to another person's interest in oil and gas, the courts are
quick to imply a duty in connection with the exercise of such power.
Power begets responsibilities and duties. A fiduciary principle be-
comes applicable. 16'
IV. LIMITS ON THE DAMAGE DONE
Those seeking to negate a fiduciary duty have not entirely carried the
day. The Reserve Oil trust duty for handling nonoperator money, the
Johnston agency duty for marketing production, the unit responsibility in
jurisdictions that follow Young, and most likely the heightened duty that
even cases like Rankin recognize within the joint-account area for prop-
erty acquisitions all are likely to survive. As already noted, even the 1989
JOA went out of its way to leave open the possibility of fiduciary respon-
sibility tracking Reserve Oil and Johnston. These cases conflict with the
absolutism of cases like Stine, but courts are almost certain to continue to
carve out such areas of special responsibility.1 62
Recently, courts have suggested new ways to reject the extremism of
the Stine approach. One pioneering Texas court of appeals limited Article
V.A. to physical operations in Abraxas Petroleum Corp. v. Hornburg. 63
The case was another internal, joint-account dispute. The working inter-
est owners, who had not paid the most recent bills, sued a fairly newly
installed operator whose term had been marked by sharp increases in
costs and a disastrous performance that ended with its plugging three of
four wells. 164 The nonoperators did not file a fiduciary claim, but alleged
161. Williams, supra note 63, at 274.
162. Some commentators argue that courts should vary the operator's duty depending
upon the operator's particular activity. See Robert Bledsoe, supra note 144, at 15-6 to -7
(arguing in part that when the operator handles funds or markets production, it "appears
logical that the Operator should function in the same manner as other fiduciaries who
handle money belonging to other parties, much the same as trustees, agents, banks, bro-
kers, and other representative parties"); see also Melanie Bell, The Evolution of the On-
shore Model Form Operating Agreement, 26 TEX. STATE BAR SECI-ION REI'oirr, OIL, GAS
& ENERGY RES. L. 4, 32, 40-41 & n.67 (noting that several authors have suggested "differ-
ent levels of liability for different Operator functions," including fiduciary duties for mar-
keting production and handling funds).
163. 20 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.).
164. Id. at 747-48. The transformation was so severe that within two years of the opera-
tor's taking over, production fell from 1,000 barrels per month to just thirty barrels.
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negligence, gross negligence, willful misconduct, breach of contract, and
waste. Abraxas argued that a jury finding that it breached the JOA by
sending an improper AFE was defective because the jury had not found it
acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct. 16 5 That is, this contract
claim was blocked by Article V.A. The interest owners denied this and
contended that the clause "applies only to causes of action arising from
lease operations." 166
The court of appeals agreed that Article V.A. does not apply to
breaches of the JOA itself. It reasoned that the Article is limited to drill-
ing operations, i.e., not by cause of action, but by type of activity. Article
V.A. is "an article which concerns the operator's authority to conduct
operations in the contract area." "[M]ore significantly," the limits are
"linked directly to imposition of the duty to act as a reasonably prudent
operator, which strictly concerns the manner in which the operator con-
ducts drilling operations on the lease."' 67 Last year another Texas court
of appeals followed Abraxas and considered a dispute over well charges
in spite of Article V.A.'s effort to limit claims to gross negligence or will-
ful misconduct.1 68 According to the same logic, not only breach of con-
tract claims, but also breach of fiduciary claims for violating duties to
interest owners should not be affected by Article V.A. unless, of course,
the alleged violation concerns physical drilling itself.
Because Stine and many of the strong disclaimer cases generally ignore
contrary authority, the clash between those cases and the trust and mar-
keting cases has not been fully resolved. With the even more restrictive
1989 JOA paying obeisance to these special duties, however, only truly
extremist courts will hold that there is no fiduciary duty even in these two
core areas. The law appears to be moving toward a standard that would
protect nonoperators in areas where the operator's interest diverges from
theirs, as courts have done with royalty owners.' 69 The ultimate contours
of the operator's fiduciary duty is likely to cover disputes over handling
joint account funds, marketing production, acquiring acreage, and using
joint account information. In these types of disputes the operator and
nonoperator have such conflicting interests that deference is not war-
ranted and higher responsibility is needed.
165. Id. at 758-59.
166. Id. at 759.
167. Id.
168. Cone v. Fagadau Energy Corp., 68 S.W.3d 147, 154-55 (Tex. App.-Eastland 200 1,
pet. denied). The unhappy nonoperator actually pled a variety of causes of action, includ-
ing one for breach of fiduciary duty. See id. at 147. The court's discussion of Article V.A.,
however, occurred in a section on well charges that couched the issue in terms of "breaches
of specific terms of the agreement" that were "in the nature of an accounting." Id. at 155.
So there is no direct holding on what effect Article V.A. might have on breach of fiduciary
claims.
169. See generally 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 49, § 856.3, at 411-12 ("Ordina-
rily, the interests of the lessor and lessee will coincide; the lessee will have everything to
gain and nothing to lose by selling the product. Where the interests of the two diverge and




V. AMERICAN COURTS SHOULD NOT JETTISON INVESTOR
PROTECTION CAVALIERLY
The substantive debate over the correct level of behavior, no doubt,
will rage on. Major producers, with their concentrated resources and
stakes, are likely to dominate the debate through their legions of lawyers
and lobbyists.17 0 But power is not a substitute for reason, nor is it a rea-
son to vary from well-settled interpretations. Recent decisions do not rec-
oncile their narrow linguistic readings with the older tradition in which
the operator could be held a fiduciary to its investors. Under traditional
rules, the activities of trustees and agents, such as acquiring property in
an area of joint interest, disclosing information, handling partners'
money, and selling their production, were regulated by the high standards
of behavior that courts denominate fiduciary. It is irrational to reduce this
duty because of concerns that only arise when third parties try to extend
unlimited liability to nonoperating investors. The restrictive courts need
to take a new, reasoned look at these issues and ask whether they really
should continue to deviate from the older, mainstream interpretation.
As far as blanket exculpations and disclaimers go, courts should adopt
the traditionally restrictive approach to tort exclusions and, in addition,
consider the antitrust problems raised by joint industry efforts to improve
their bargaining position. State legislatures should also consider statuto-
rily barring efforts to remove the industry from the ordinary application
of fiduciary principles; they should legislate to prevent the JOA from lim-
iting the operator's tort liability to its partners. At a minimum, state legis-
latures should protect the areas where the operator can most readily
profit from its investors: handling funds, marketing production, acquiring
property, and concealing information on its performance.
170. Recent capture theory has come from economists and been one of the impetuses
for deregulation. See Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General The-
ory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMTr. ScL. 3 (1971). For earlier models from political
science, see MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYM13OLIC USES OF PoLrncs 24 nn.1-5, 56 (1985),
which provides a list of five major post-War studies of administrative behavior that support
an "instrumental" theory of agencies "as economic and political instruments of the parties
they regulate and benefit, not of a reified 'society,' 'general will,' or 'public interest."'
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